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hrom Dictatorship to Democracy:
Environmental Reform in Chile
By ScoTT C. LACUNZA*
Since consideration must be given to the health of the inhabitants...
this too must receive carefid attention-because those things that our
bodies use most frequently and in greatest quantity make the greatest
contribution to our health, and this is the scale on which air and
water have a natural capacity to affect us.
Aristotle, Politics WSSObS
The Constitution guarantees to all persons the right to live in an envi-
ronment free from contamination. It is the duty of the State to watch
over the protection of this right and the preservation of nature.
Constitution of the Republic of Chile-
I. Introduction
At the historic Summit of the Americas in December 1994,3 Chile
became the first Latin American country to receive an invitation to
* Member of the Class of 1996. B.A. University of California, San Diego, 1992.
1. ARIsToTLE, THE Porics 422 (T.A. Sinclair et al. trans., Penguin Books rev. ed.
1981).
2. CHMr CONST. (Const. of the Rep. of Chile, 1980) ch. III, art. 19, § S.
3. On December 9, 1994, the leaders of the 34 democratic countries in the WVestern
Hemisphere met in Miami, Florida, to convene the Summit of the Americas. The last
meeting of this type was held in April 1967 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The key topic of
the Summit was free trade between the countries of North, Central, and South America
and the Caribbean. In addition to Chile's invitation to join NAFTA, all 34 attending na-
tions pledged to establish a hemispherical free trade zone, stretching from Alaska to Ant-
arctica, by 2005. It will be designated the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This
ambitious undertaking would create the world's largest trading market with over SOO mil-
lion consumers buying $13 trillion in goods and services. Julian Beltrame, Summit of the
Americas: Chile's NAFTA Entry Protection From U.S. "Elephant," OttAwA Cmzvr., D e.
12, 1994, at A5. There are two primary ways of creating this huge common market: adding
countries one-by-one to existing trade agreements or integrating existing trade blocs as a
whole with each other. At this time, it appears the FTAA will evolve by adding countries
to the existing free trade structure of North America, with Chile setting the stage for a long
line of prospective members.
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join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4
Although formal negotiations for Chile's accession were launched in
June 1995, talks were effectively stalled by the end of the year after
Congress failed to provide President Clinton with fast-track authoriza-
tion.5 The issue of fast-track authorization is currently split along
party lines,6 and Congress presumably will not provide such authoriza-
tion until after the upcoming 1996 presidential elections.7 As a result,
although originally slated for membership by mid-1996, experts now
predict that Chile will join NAFTA by the end of 1997.8
The announcement of Chile's invitation was hardly a surprise, in
light of the widespread speculation over recent years that Chile was
the only major Latin American country prepared to enter NAFTA. 9
Why has Chile, a relatively small country with a population of less
than fourteen million people, been selected as the first Latin Ameri-
can country to join NAFTA? Chile has emerged from the debt crisis
of the early 1980s powered by the fastest growing and most successful
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 & 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). NAFTA gradually eliminates tariffs and
other trade barriers among member nations.
5. Chilean Minister Sees NAFTA Entry Progress Frozen, Reuters, Nov. 20, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File. "Fast-track" authorization enables the
President to negotiate trade deals with the valuable assurance that Congress will consider
the agreement as a whole, with only a yes or no vote. This authorization allows the Presi-
dent to negotiate knowing that a final agreement will not be altered substantively by the
time it emerges from congressional debate.
6. In general, Republicans argue that free trade agreements should be limited to is-
sues of trade, while Democrats maintain that side agreements addressing labor and envi-
ronmental issues should be affixed to free trade arrangements. See Tony Munroe, Chile's
NAFTA Membership Lost in Limbo; White House-Congress Battle Stalls Approval, WASH.
TiMEs, Oct. 15, 1995, at A8. The issue with Chile is whether the United States will require
side agreements in a free trade accord, as was the case with Mexico, or whether the United
States will limit its negotiations strictly to issues of free trade.
7. See U.S. NGOs Step Up Resistance to Trade Agreement, LATIN Am. REGIONAL
REP.: MEx. & CENrr. AM., Nov. 2, 1995, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws
File.
8. Once the issue of fast-track authorization is resolved, experts believe Chile's bid
for membership will encounter less opposition than Mexico faced during original NAFTA
deliberations. See Munroe, supra note 6, at A8 ("Unlike Mexico, whose accession to
NAFTA proved controversial as many Americans feared jobs would be lost across the
border, Chile's geographic remoteness makes acceptance more likely."); U.S. NGOs Step
Up Resistance to Trade Agreement, supra note 7, at 4 ("None of the big agricultural lobbies
have a problem with Chile since it produces fruit out of the U.S. season.").
9. Indeed, President Bush pledged to Chile in 1992 that free trade negotiations be-
tween the United States and Chile would begin as soon as possible after NAFTA was
passed. Michael G. Wilson, Building on the NAFTA: Forging a Free Trade Agreement with
Chile, HERITAGE FouND. REP., June 27, 1994, No. 991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Hfrpts File.
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economy in Latin America.10 In addition, Chile's peaceful transition
in 1990 from a military dictatorship to a bona fide democracy has
made Chile an appealing prospect to its North American neighbors.11
These elements have combined to give Chile a "proven track record
for political and economic stability over recent years."12 Because of
its democratic government, free market system, and rapid economic
growth, the United States has viewed Chile as a model candidate for a
free trade agreement,13 with President Clinton referring to Chile as
the "ideal partner."' 4
Not surprisingly, Chile's NAFTA invitation has sparked renewed
interest in the narrow country, which stretches along 2700 miles of
South America's vast Pacific coastline.' 5 Most of the current attention
10. Nathaniel C. Nash, Terrorism Jolts a Prospering Chile, N.Y. TLms, Apr. 9, 1991, at
D1.
11. Kirsteen Macleod, Chile Muls No. 4 Spot in NAFTA Fast.Growing Economy
Rated Safest Country in Latin America for Foreign Investment, FIN. PowT, Sept. 17, 1993,
§ 1, at 9. With regard to Chile, the United States "has wider objectives than the purely
commercial. It is keen that Chile, which it regards as one of Latin America's most open
and modem economies, should be rewarded for its progress." David Pilling, NAFTA Ac-
cord Back on Chile's Agenda-Environment and Labor Issues are Erpected to Dominate
Talks with the U.S., FIN. Tims, May 27, 1994, at 7. Moreover, by expanding NAFTA
beyond North America and pursuing an aggressive free trade agenda with Latin America,
the United States "could solidify free-market democracy in a region that only 15 years ago
was dominated by dictators and was beset by diminishing hopes of prosperity." Wilson,
supra note 9. "Acknowledging the country that has reformed the most will undermine
populist and nationalist opponents of free market reforms that still exist throughout the
region." Id. As a result, "[other countries in Latin America would be encouraged to
follow Chile's democratic and free market model, thus advancing the prospects for hemi-
sphere-wide free trade." Id. Indeed, already Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica. El
Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela are modeling many of their economic programs after
Chile's. Id. Thus, allowing Chile to join NAFTA would benefit the United States because,
among other things, it would increase interest in the free market economic system and
stimulate democracy throughout Latin America. See Alexander Hunecus, Chile Environ-
mental Mess Prompts Warning by U.S., S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1992, at A9.
12. Roger Turner, Model Economy Offers High Degree of Stabiliy" Chile; 1993 World
Trade Outlook, Bus. Am., Apr. 19, 1993, at 13.
13. See Michael G. Wilson, U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Igniting Economic Pros-
perity in the Americas, HE=rrAGE FOUND. REP., July 31,1992, No. 909, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Hfrpts File; see also Strobe Talbott, Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in
the Americas: U.S. Leadership in the Post-Cold War World, Address Before the Chilean
Council for International Relations (July 10, 1995), in DEP'T ST. DiSPATCH, July 17, 19S9
("In our Administration's policy toward this region, we have two priority objectives: one is
to support the growth of democratic institutions; the other is to advance prosperity through
open markets and free trade.").
14. Chile Invited to Join Nafta, Reuters World Service, Dec. 11, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Reuwld File.
15. 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDiA BRrrANmCA 21 (15th ed. 1991) [hereinafter E.%cv.
croPEDA BmrTANNcA].
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has focused exclusively on Chile's thriving economy, which econo-
mists have praised for its free market approach.
While Chile's recent economic successes are undoubtedly impres-
sive, the costs and consequences of these accomplishments must be
evaluated in order to assess the overall value of the country's eco-
nomic approach accurately. Though frequently overshadowed by the
economic praise, Chile has paid a heavy price for its economic accom-
plishments. By focusing primarily on rapid economic development,
Chile has neglected its environment in numerous ways. Unregulated
growth has saddled the country with serious environmental chal-
lenges, including severe air pollution, extensive deforestation, and
widespread water contamination. By 1993, Chile's environmental
degradation had reached unprecedented levels, largely due to Chile's
overdependence on industries which exploit the country's natural re-
sources. 16 As explained in a recent report issued by the postmilitary
government, "The economic growth of Chile has taken place at the
expense of the environment.' 1 7 The first purpose of this Note is to
bring attention to this often overlooked aspect of Chile's stellar eco-
nomic growth. This Note will examine the environmental conse-
quences of the growth-intensive policies of the former military regime,
policies largely responsible for Chile's current economic successes, to
determine whether Chile stands as a model for other developing na-
tions to follow.
Recently, Chile's democratic government took a greater interest
in the country's environment and a new mandate-aimed at combat-
ing environmental degradation throughout the country-emerged
from the transition administration.' 8 In addition to implementing sev-
eral key regulations by executive decree, Chile recently enacted the
most comprehensive environmental protection measure in the coun-
try's history, the Environmental Framework Law of 1994. The second
purpose of this Note is to examine this recent reform movement to
demonstrate that Chile is now attempting to achieve a balance be-
tween preserving its environment, sustaining its natural resources, and
maintaining economic growth. This Note will show that, although en-
16. Business Outlook" Chile's Favorable Business Climate, Bus. LATIN AI., July 19,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
17. Nathaniel C. Nash, Chileans Pay Dearly for Economic Growth, N.Y. TIMrS, Nov.
10, 1991, § 4, at 6.
18. The term "transition administration" refers to the four-year presidency of Patriclio
Aylwin, as it signalled the transition from the military regime to the present system under
democratic, civilian authority.
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vironmentally negligent in the past, Chile has taken unprecedented
steps toward confronting the myriad of problems which plague the
country from years of environmental abuse.
Part II of this Note will discuss the underlying origins of Chile's
current environmental problems by examining the legacy of the for-
mer military government. Part UI will trace the development of
Chile's new environmental awareness and reform movement by re-
viewing the economic and environmental policies of the democrati-
cally elected transition administration, which served until March 1994.
Part IV will address specific issues of environmental degradation and
the measures implemented by the government to confront these
problems. Part V will examine Chile's new Environmental Frame-
work Law and analyze its role in the context of Chile's environmental
reform movement. Finally, Part VI will speculate on the future of
Chile's reform movement through the end of the decade by examining
the current administration's approach to Chile's environmental issues.
H. The Underlying Origins of Chile's Environmental
Degradation: The Legacy of Pinochet
On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (Pi-
nochet), commander in chief of the Chilean army, overthrew Chile's
constitutional government and seized power through a bloody coup
d'6tat.19 The revolt culminated with the dramatic aerial bombing of
La Moneda, the presidential palace occupied at the time by Socialist
President Salvador Allende Gossens (Allende), an avowed Marxist., °
Though faced with overwhelming forces and given a chance to surren-
der, Allende remained in the palace to defend his democratically
elected government21 and was subsequently killed." For Chile, which
had the longest tradition of democracy in South America,' the coup
shattered "the myth that Chile's 150-year-old civilian constitutional
19. See PAM.LA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VA.ENZUELA, A NATION OF ENE.IES:
CHnE UNDER PINocH-nr 15 (1991).
20. Id. The United States, under President Richard M. Nixon, supported the over-
throw of Allende. For a complete discussion on U.S. involvement in the overthrow of
Allende and on the circumstances leading up to the revolt, see generally NATILANIEL DA-
vis, THE LAST Two YEARS OF SALVADOR ALLENDE (19S5).
21. Allende was elected by a 36% plurality of the vote. DAVIS, supra nole 20, at 5.
22. Id. at 270. It is disputed whether Allende committed suicide or %%as killed by Pi-
nochet's forces when they assaulted the palace. Id
23. Timothy O'Leary, Jewel of Latin America Booming; Chile Stands in Line After
Mexico to Join NAFTA, GAzETTE (Montreal), Jan. 31, 1994, at B3.
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government was invincible."'24 This pivotal event marked the begin-
ning of Chile's fate for the next seventeen years, from 1973 to 1990.
Since Pinochet ruled with total authority,25 a brief summary of his
economic policies during this period is necessary in order to under-
stand the underpinnings of the environmental problems facing Chile
today.
Pinochet was a staunch laissez-faire capitalist and sought to eradi-
cate most of the Socialist policies introduced during Allende's brief
reign, which had "caused economic and social havoc and provoked the
revolt."2 6 During the seventeen-year span of the military regime, the
dominant priority was rapid economic growth at all costs.2 7 Toward
this end, Pinochet eliminated price controls, reduced tariffs across the
board to a flat rate of approximately ten percent, privatized most of
the large state-owned enterprises, lowered taxes, liberalized invest-
ment rules,2  retired Chile's debt burden, reduced trade barriers,2 9
24. CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 19, at 20.
25. Brook Larmer, The Greening of Santiago, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at 41. After
the revolt, the military established a four-person junta to run the country, consisting of the
respective commanders of each branch of the armed forces (army, navy, and air force),
plus the head of the national police, the carabineros. Regardless, Pinochet, ensconced as
"President" of Chile in 1974, held decisive power. The junta suspended all political parties,
banned Marxist parties, 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BWrTANNICA, supra note 15, at 29, and sus-
pended Chile's 1925 constitution. Kaleidoscope: Current World Data, Jan. 20, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, KCWD File.
26. O'Leary, supra note 23, at B3. After taking office, Allende implemented radical
left-wing policies advocating, among other things, nationalization of industry. As a result,
many businesses, including the vital copper mines, were expropriated. In addition, Allende
raised incomes, redistributed income, and provided social services which surpassed reve-
nues. Tom Wicker, Breaking the Cycle, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 23, 1990, at A23. Increased pub-
lic spending briefly stimulated growth, but falling production brought severe supply
shortages and soaring inflation. Id. Within a few years of taking office, Allende delivered
"economic chaos accented by 5% negative growth." Stefan Halper, Chile Completes Lead-
ership Circle, Looks for Direction, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at AS. See also Kevin Naff,
Chilean Economy Serves as a Model for Latin America, Bus. CREDrr, June 1995, at 33
("The coup of 1973 was viewed by many Chileans as necessary to rid the economy of
Marxism, avert class war, restore order, and salvage the economy."); 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRrTANNiCA, supra note 15, at 35 ("At the outset the junta received the support of the
oligarchy and a sizable part of the middle-class and the right-wing movements. This sup-
port by moderate political forces, including many Christian Democrats, can be explained
by their belief that a dictatorship represented a transitional stage necessary to restoring the
status quo as it had been before 1970. Very soon they were to concede that the military
officers in power had their own political objectives, including the repression of all left-wing
and centre political forces.").
27. Nathaniel C. Nash, Scrubbing the Skies over Chile, N.Y. TMs, July 6,1992, at A4.
28. Wilson, supra note 13.
29. Wilson, supra note 9.
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and allowed businesses to operate unfettered.30 He cut the govern-
ment workforce from 650,000 to 150,000 employees and cut military
expenditures from 5.77% of the budget in 1975 to 3.02% in 1 99 1 .31
Significantly, as part of the deregulation of the economy, Pinochet
lifted bans on the burning of coal and wood and eased controls on
public transportation.3" The bus system was completely deregulated
and, as a result, thousands of old vehicles were imported.3
Pinochet's economic approach was ultimately successful, and the
unregulated free market system finally began to prosper in the late
1980s. By 1990, Chile, the "economic star of South America,"3, was
winning praise for its solid, export-driven growth rate.3 s Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and exports were growing, while inflation was
under control? 6 By 1994 Chile had experienced ten consecutive years
of economic growth, and GDP growth averaged six percent since
1985, the highest in the region37 and the best record in Latin America.
Impressively, the 1992 economy posted its best overall performance in
thirty years with a record 10.4% growth, one of the highest rates in the
world at the time.38 The same year Chile was described as the "most
robust and stable economy in South America," 39 and investor confi-
dence remains high due to Chile's excellent record for protection of
foreign investment.4 Because foreign investors are offered favorable
30. Ellen Hale, Chile Paying Environmental Price for Economic Success, Gannett
News Service, Mar. 18,1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Gns File. Pinochet also
enlisted the assistance of a group of University of Chicago economics professors, known as
the "Chicago Boys," to help streamline the economy along a free market course. Nash,
supra note 27, at A4. See also Eugene Robinson, Chile Weighs Free Market's Cost, Post-
Pinochet Rulers Address Environmental Residue of Boom Years, WVASH. PosT, Nov. 13,
1991, at A24 (discussing Pinochet's economic policies).
31. Halper, supra note 26, at AS.
32. Paul Mylrea, Chile's Capital Plagued by Smog, Begins to Fight Back, Reuter Libr.
Rep., Sept. 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nes Library, Txtnws File.
33. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
34. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment (CNN television
broadcast, June 6, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, CNN File.
35. Tim Frasca, Chile Seeks to Reverse Years of Pollution, CHusTL Scl. MONITOR,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 4.
36. Business Outlook Chile, Bus. LAmN AK., Aug. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
37. Roger Turner, Chile Sets an Examplefor Others to Follow, Bus. AM., May 1994, at
18.
38. Macleod, supra note 11, at 9.
39. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
40. Tirner, supra note 37, at 18. Significantly, Chile %-as the first Latin American
country to receive an investment-grade rating since the debt crisis of the 19Ss. Chile
Rated as Low Investment Risk, Bus. LATn AM., Sept. 7,1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, Eiubla File. In 1992 Chile was rated above Me.ico, Venezuela, Argentina, and
1996]
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terms regarding taxation, expatriation of profits, legal protection, and
respect for property fights, Chile has attracted some six billion dollars
in foreign investment since 1985.4 ' In 1993 unemployment was 4.5%,
down from 12% in the 1980s and the lowest in thirty years.4 By 1994
economic growth had lifted one million Chileans out of poverty since
1987. 43 With such growth, Chile has indeed "pioneered a develop-
ment path confirming the nation of 14 million as Latin America's first
Asian tiger."44
Little attention was devoted to the environmental horrors this
economic boom was producing, however.4S Structurally, Chile's econ-
Brazil, id., and classified as the safest country in Latin America for foreign investment.
Macleod, supra note 11, at 9. This enabled Chilean businesses to offer equity and bonds to
investors who were only permitted to buy from investment-grade nations. Chile Rated as
Low Investment Risk, supra. Foreign investment reached $1.4 billion in 1992, Maclead,
supra note 11, at 9, and $1.7 billion in 1993. Turner, supra note 37, at 18. In July 1995
Standard & Poors raised Chile's long-term foreign currency debt from triple B+s to a single
A- and reaffirmed Chile's double A local currency rating. S & P Ups Chile's Long-Term
FX Rating to A Minus, Reuters, July 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws
File ("The upgrade of Chile's foreign currency rating reflects continued prudent
macroeconomic management, which has bolstered the country's external financial position
and markedly reduced its vulnerability to swings both in investor confidence ... and in the
global business cycle."). This foreign currency upgrade made Chile Standard & Poor's first
A-rated Latin American country. Duff Takes Mexico Off Watchlist; Chile Gets S & P's
First LatAm A, LDC DEBT REPJLATN AM. Mrs., July 17, 1995, at 10, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Abbb File. The country's stable political atmosphere, conservative
economic policies, and diverse export sector were significant factors in the upgrade. Id.
41. By the second half of this decade, foreign investors are expected to commit
roughly $20 billion in new capital to Chile's economy. Wilson, supra note 9.
42. Tbrner, supra note 37, at 18.
43. O'Leary, supra note 23, at B3. However, severe socioeconomic problems still exist
throughout the country, as approximately 30% of Chileans still live in poverty conditions.
Chile: Battle Against Pollution, Bus. LATIN AM., July 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, Eiubla File; Nash, supra note 10, at D1.
44. Halper, supra note 26, at A8; see also Naff, supra note 26, at 33 ("Switzerland's
World Economic Forum ranked Chile the fifth most competitive newly industrialized coun-
try in the world, behind only Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia.").
45. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4. Although this Note focuses on the environmental
costs, Chile has also paid for its economic successes through numerous human rights viola-
tions. See Nash, supra note 10, at D1; see also Halper, supra note 26, at A8 ("While earn-
ing one of the nastiest reputations in the later 20th century, Gen. Pinochet's lengthy reign
combined economic liberalism with political repression to gain flexibility in the center ....
But two decades of brutality and trauma took a toll .... Thousands [have] seen friends
and family members simply 'disappear'.... About 2,000 cases remain open."); Naff, supra
note 26, at 33 ("Thousands of civilians were murdered, jailed, tortured, brutalized, or ex-
iled in the first four years of the dictatorship."). Unfortunately, Pinochet's continuing con-
trol of the military has meant that the abuses of the past have gone largely unpunished.
Welcome Chile to NAFTA, GAzETrE (Montreal), Dec. 13, 1994, at B2; see also Kaleido-
scope: Current World Data, supra note 25 ("The role of the military has been reduced, but
Pinochet still wields sufficient power to bar the government from calling members of the
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omy is based largely on natural resources, such as mining, forestry,
fishing, and agriculture.' The free market model implemented by the
military regime encouraged the exploitation of Chile's resources, and
the economic system itself discouraged governmental interference.
The push for economic growth and the openness of the free market
system displaced any motivation for effective environmental regula-
tion during the bulk of the Pinochet years. As a result, Chile was
notoriously lax in enforcing existing environmental laws to counter
the destructive trends of its enormous economic growth.47 Instead,
Pinochet let industries and businesses pollute and exploit resources
essentially at will.48 By 1990 Chile was described as a "catalogue of
ecological disasters, 49 the result of economic development at the ex-
pense of the environment. Santiago, Chile's capital, is now burdened
with severe air pollution, and as a whole the nation suffers from water
contamination, hazardous industrial emissions, deforestation, coastal
oceanic pollution, fauna depletion, and habitat destruction.
I1. The Emergence of Environmental Awareness and the
Movement Toward Environmental Reform
A. The Restoration of Democracy
By the latter part of the 1980s, as Chileans began to see the "dark
side of unregulated capitalist growth,"50 the military regime came
under increasing pressure to address the environmental issues which
were arising from years of unregulated market forces. The military
government had largely ignored these growing problems, such as the
ever-worsening air quality in Santiago. Ultimately, public discontent
played a crucial role in the call to clean up Chile's environment.
Mounting public pressure persuaded the military government, for the
first time during its reign, to invoke emergency measures in mid-1989
in an attempt to alleviate Santiago's air pollution.5 ' However, such
measures were not viewed as long-term solutions to the problem by a
armed forces and military intelligence to account for the deaths, torture, and disappear-
ances of dissidents during the Pinochet regime.").
46. 16 ENcYcLoPED A Br-rAN NcA, supra note 15, at 27.
47. See Larmer, supra note 25, at 41 ("Some 700 law and 2,000 regulations wvere on
the books, but only one official had the job of enforcing them.").
48. See Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9 (stating Pinochet considered "environmental-
ism a leftist conspiracy worthy of repression").
49. Mylrea, supra note 32.
50. Larmer, supra note 25, at 41.
51. James F. Smith, Chileans Face Downside of Economic Growth-Sfag~ering Air
Pollution, L.A. Tams, July 22, 1989, at A33.
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growing number of increasingly vocal, dissatisfied Chileans. Students
participated in pollution "die-ins" at major intersections, and Roman
Catholic priests staged protest marches while wearing face masks."2
Not surprisingly, the rising magnitude of public discontent soon thrust
the environmental issues into the political arena. The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Christian Democratic Party-the party destined to
supplant the dictatorship-accused the military regime of "irresponsi-
bility, negligence, and ineptitude" in its approach to environmental
matters.53
The increasing public dissatisfaction over Santiago's air quality
reflected an emerging awareness among many Chileans that the envi-
ronment, and thus their health, was in danger. This awareness would
become a significant factor at the polls. The constitution approved in
1980 mandated that a national plebiscite would be held in October
1988, at which time the people could either endorse Pinochet's regime
for another term or demand a new government, elected by popular
vote.54 If the people did not support Pinochet in the referendum, a
new government would be selected by democratic presidential and
congressional elections in December 1989. 55 Because the military
government was largely apathetic to environmental issues, many
Chileans looked to the 1988 referendum and 1989 elections, the latter
of which would be the first free balloting in sixteen years, as spring-
boards to environmental reform.56
52. Id.
53. Barbara Durr, Smog Has No National Boundaries in Heavily Polluted Chilean
Capital Air Quality is Becoming a Hot Issue, CHi. TRm., June 25, 1989, at 6.
54. See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 15, at 35. On September 11, 1980,
a new constitution was approved by a national plebiscite organized by the military junta.
Walden Country Reps., Jan. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Courep File.
This constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Chile of 1980, took effect on March
11, 1981, and abolished the suspended 1925 constitution. See WoRLD FAcrBooK, Oct. 20,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Wofact File. Although the approval of the 1980
constitution extended Pinochet's "presidency" until 1990, the constitution mandated that
there be a second national plebiscite in 1988 to determine whether Pinochet's reign would
thereafter be extended to 1997. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BMrANNICA, supra note 15, at 29, 35.
The 1980 constitution was amended in July 1989 to increase the number of members
elected to the Senate, to delete the provision prohibiting Marxist groups, and to equalize
the ratio of civilians to military representatives on the Council of National Security.
Walden Country Reps., supra. "However, efforts to reform the Constitution to grant the
President the power to remove military commanders in chief and to reduce right-wing bias
in the electoral system have faced extensive opposition from conservative politicians." Ka-
leidoscope: Current World Data, supra note 25.
55. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA B-rIANmCA, supra note 15, at 35.
56. See Durr, supra note 53, at 6.
[Vol. 19:539
Environmental Reform in Chile
Pinochet failed to receive majority support in the 1988 referen-
dum, 7 which paved the way for general elections in 1989 to select
Pinochet's successor. In a relatively peaceful election s control of the
government passed to Patricio Aylwin Az6car (Ayhvin), leader of the
Coalition of Parties for Democracy,59 for a four-year term.
The victory of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy and the
selection of President Aylwin represented, among other things, a de-
mand by the people that the government confront the country's envi-
ronmental ills. The victory also reflected a growing environmental
awareness among Chileans in general.60 As an environmental expert
with the National Energy Commission observed a few months after
the election, "For a long time, Chileans were concerned only with hav-
ing a decent job, a place to live, and enough to eat. Now they are
realizing other factors affect the quality of life, including the
environment."161
B. The Aylwin Administration (1990-1994)
1. Economic Policy
Chile's economic growth continued as the transitional govern-
ment-Chile's first democratically elected authority in seventeen
years-took office in March 1990. The Aylwin administration's first
priorities were stabilizing the country politically and preserving the
thriving economy. In general, Aylwin's government adhered to the
free market system instituted by Pinochet and remained committed to
57. The vote was 54% to 43% against extending Pinochet's reign until 1997. Angelo
Codevilla, Is Pinochet the Model?, FoRnioN AFF., Nov. 1993, at 127.
58. See e.g., O'Leary, supra note 23, at B3 (-During national elections in Decembar,
Chile was the picture of tranquility. To no one's surprise, the candidate of the ruling Chris-
tian Democratic Party won the nine-party race with 55 per cent of the vote. Afterard, not
a rustle was heard in the streets, military barracks and stock exchanges.").
59. The Coalition of Parties for Democracy consisted of 16 centrist and leftist parties
which joined to oppose Pinochet's candidacy. 16 ENCYCLOPEDiA BRrr ANNicA, supra note
15, at 29. Specifically, Aylwin was a member of the centrist Christian Democratic Party.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Steve Kidneya, New Laws Spur Demand in Chile for Envirotehi, E!.,"T
WIc, Jan. 5,1995 ("A decade of economic expansion and expanding international trade has
resulted in greater environmental problems and an expanding awareness on the part of
both government and business to address them.").
61. Gary Marx, Choking Chileans Try to Clear Air, Cm. Tam., Aug. 19, 1990, at 19.
By the end of 1995, it was noted that the "environment is a heated issue in Chile, where
ecological movements criticize economic liberalization, one of the basic pillars of %hich is
the mass exportation of raw materials." Chile-Environment: Central Bank to Provide
Regular Updates, Inter Press Service, Oct. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library,
Inpres File.
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private sector growth. However, Aylwin did make some changes 62
and, unlike Pinochet, he introduced environmental regulations by the
middle of his term. Throughout its four-year span, the Aylwin admin-
istration remained a leading proponent of trade liberalization. 63
Initially, Aylwin was able to maintain Chile's phenomenal eco-
nomic growth. As noted previously, in 1992, in the middle of Aylwin's
term, Chile experienced its highest GDP growth in thirty years-an
impressive 10.4%. With rapid GDP expansion came export diversifi-
cation, stronger financial markets, and slowing inflation.64 By the end
of 1992, experts were predicting that Chile's economic performance
would continue to develop throughout the decade.
65
However, with the world in a recession in late 1993, Chile found
it increasingly difficult to maintain the aggressive export-oriented eco-
nomic policy which had fueled its enormous growth.66 During that
year, Chile experienced a one billion dollar foreign trade deficit, its
first since 1985.67 The primary cause was the decline in world com-
modity prices, particularly for copper, fishmeal, and cellulose-Chile's
main exports.63 As a result, Chile adjusted its economic strategies in
1993 to account for the sustained slow-down which was anticipated as
growth and employment approached full capacity over the decade.69
In addition to the drop in world export prices, Chile's environmental
problems forced the country to reduce its dependence on industries
that exploit natural resources and, in the process, pollute the environ-
ment.70 Consequently, by the first quarter of 1994, at the end of
Aylwin's term, Chile's GDP growth had slowed to between five and
six percent-still a healthy rate, but down from 1992's remarkable
rate of 10.4%. 71
62. Among other things, he separated the central bank from the government, raised
taxes on business to pay for more social programs, and lifted the minimum wage, increas-
ing the cost of labor. Nash, supra note 10, at D1.
63. Turner, supra note 12.
64. Business Outlook- Chile, Bus. LATIN AM., Dec. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
65. Id.
66. Changing Priorities: Anticipated Changes in Patterns, Bus. LATIN AM., Sept. 27,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
67. brner, supra note 37.
68. Ide
69. Changing Priorities: Anticipated Changes in Patterns, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. See generally R. D. Crozier, Chile, MINING ANN. REV., July 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Chile File ("Despite the crisis which has seriously affected com-
modity prices on the world market, Chile's economy has been buoyant, mainly due to the
flood of foreign investment in the mineral industry, ocean farming, forestry and fruit grow-
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2. Environmental Policy
Upon taking office in 1990, President Aylwin was left the "daunt-
ing task" of addressing the environmental aftermath of Pinochet's un-
regulated economic system.7 As the first democratic leader in
seventeen years, Aylwin was initially more concerned with stabilizing
the political situation and proving economic growth could be main-
tained under a democratic government than he was with imposing
sweeping environmental changes across the country. Thus, with other
concerns consuming the bulk of the administration's time, initial envi-
ronmental policy consisted of implementing emergency measures
when necessary, such as those activated in Santiago during heavily
polluted winter days.
However, the administration's gradual approach to environmen-
tal issues and the slow pace of environmental regulation was rejected
by an increasingly vocal lobby.7' An increasing number of Chileans
wanted the government to deal with the ominous smog on a long-term
basis. Indicative of the increasing priority afforded to environmental
concerns, many Chileans advocated protecting the environment even
at the cost of slowing the country's stellar economic growth.7Y
Although the administration implemented short-term emergency
procedures to alleviate Santiago's air pollution, the extent of Chile's
environmental degradation necessitated long-term reform. In es-
sence, the basic environmental system itself was in dire need of funda-
mental restructuring. The system scattered much of the jurisdictional
responsibility75 among several different agencies, resulting in overlap,
confusion, and, ultimately, an inadequate enforcement apparatus 7 6
ing, and particularly in the stock exchange .... ."); Robert Taylor, Too Good to be Trite,
BANKE, Nov. 1995, at 86 ("A monetary and fiscal tightening to rein in an overheated
economy slowed GDP growvth to 4.2%" in 1994).
72. See Larmer, supra note 25, at 41 ("Both blessed and cursed by Chile's growth,
President Patricio Aylwin now faces a daunting task: protect the environment w~ithout
sacrificing the economy.").
73. Ken Warn, Survey of Chile, FiN. Tihms, May 19, 1993, at 41.
74. See Gallup: Environment a Global Concern, ENV'T XV.. May 7. 1992 (A 1992 poll
found that 63% of Chileans surveyed selected the protection of the environment as more
important than economic growth); Hale, supra note 30 ("We haven't reached the point of
no return yet... Chile is in a perfect position to develop in an environmentally and socially
sound way. But we have to settle for less than this miracle growth."').
75. See Achieving World Class as a Polluter; Mining Industry is Main Source of Sulphu-
ric Acid Emissions, LAn'N Am. Wwv. REP., Mar. 19, 1992, at 11, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Txtnws File [hereinafter Achieving World Class as a Polluter].
76. Lauren Bradbury, Environmental Reform is Under Way in Chile, Bus. Am., Aug.
23, 1993, at 6. The article describes the system as follows:
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Moreover, due to the lack of prior enforcement during the military
regime, many official regulations were unknown to government au-
thorities.77 Finally, though private individuals had standing to file law-
suits seeking enforcement of existing regulations, the structure of the
legal process-with a mass of unorganized laws and decrees-made
such action intimidating.
78
By the middle of his term, Aylwin was able to focus more atten-
tion on the environmental issues plaguing the country. The fledgling
democratic government had to look for a policy that would strike a
balance between restrictive environmental regulation and continued
growth in a market economy, but one that would nevertheless address
Chile's ever-increasing number of environmental concerns. As a first
step, the administration officially endorsed the policy of sustainable
development, which contrasted dramatically with the approach of the
former military regime,7 9 and placed ecological issues high on its
agenda.8 0 In essence, the endorsement of sustainable development
signalled the emergence of Chile's environmental reform movement
on behalf of the government. As Aylwin declared in 1992, "I believe
the economic criteria prevailed over the environment and that's why
my government wants to confront this problem head-on."81 Accord-
ingly, by 1992 the Aylwin administration had adopted "[s]ustainable
development, poverty, depletion of the ozone layer.., coastal pollu-
tion, soil depletion, and desertification"'  as Chile's central concerns
for presentation at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.83
In addition to the cumbersome assortment of laws and decrees, a major impedi-
ment to enforcement of Chile's environmental regulations is the mix of lines of
authority between the country's different ministries. There are more than 70 of-
fices and agencies with some kind of environmental authority, but no one minis-
try has either full control or responsibility for environmental policy, creating
conflict and confusion.
Id
77. Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and Plan New Ones, ENV'T WATCH
LATIN AM., Nov. 1991, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
78. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
79. Enrique Martini, Environment: Chile Finalizes Its Position for the Earth Summit,
Inter Press Service, Feb. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File.
80. Mylrea, supra note 32.
81. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment, supra note 34. See
also Nash, supra note 27, at A4 ("Experts give the Aylwin Government passing grades for
its actions to date, but add that it is only now casting about for a comprehensive plan.").
82. Martini, supra note 79.
83. For more information on UNCED, see generally Brian B.A. McAllister, Note, The
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a
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The Aylwin administration also took significant strides toward
environmental reform on a practical level. This occurred primarily in
three ways. First, the government adopted several measures designed
to address Chile's most pressing environmental issues. Chile's three
worst areas of environmental degradation soon became the adminis-
tration's top three environmental priorities: Santiago's severe air pol-
lution, widespread water contamination, and pollution caused by themining industry.84 To fight air pollution in the Santiago area, the ad-
ministration established a Special Decontamination Commission for
the Metropolitan Region (CEDRM) in 1990, directed by eight federal
government ministers.85 During the course of the Aylwin administra-
tion, environmental management in Santiago was driven by CEDRM
and presidential decree. Significantly, regulations were implemented
which addressed emission standards, regulatory enforcement, moni-
toring of air quality, modernization of transportation equipment, and
conversion to cleaner fuels.86 Of particular importance were decrees
which regulated industry emissions, vehicular emissions, and mining
smelter emissions.
Second, in addition to implementing regulatory decrees, the gov-
ernment responded to growing public concern over the environment
by undertaking steps to diagnose and improve the many flaws in
Chile's basic environmental regulatory system After a year of work,
the National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA), the cen-
tral agency responsible for organizing environmental policy for the
country, finished compiling and cataloging Chile's existing laws and
regulations in 1993. The result was an 845-page document containing
2700 separate itemsY CONAMA prepared the comprehensive inven-
tory of existing environmental laws to consolidate the scattered regu-
latory process, to better catalog current laws, to find out exactly what
new laws were needed to deal with the country's environmental
problems, and to determine how officials should best enforce them. 3
Finally, in what was perhaps the most profound environmental
change to occur during the transition administration, Aylwin signed
New Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among Human Rights, the Environment, and
Sustainable Development, 16 HAsTmIs INT'L & Comp. L. RFv. 6S9 (1993).
84. See Achieving World Class as a Polluter, supra note 75, at 11.
85. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards for Cargo Vehicles, EV'T VAT H L,r4
Am., Mar. 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter Santitago
Updates Emissions Standards].
86. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and Plan New Ones, supra note 77.
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Chile's first-ever comprehensive environmental law in 1994, known as
the Environmental Framework Law. The Framework Law provides
Chile with a comprehensive scheme for existing and future environ-
mental regulations that will facilitate the coordination and enforce-
ment of Chile's environmental laws. In short, the Framework Law
will enable subsequent administrations to establish an effective regula-
tory system that can both manage and protect Chile's environmental
resources.
IV. Specific Issues of Environmental Degradation
A. Air Pollution in Santiago
1. Causes
Air pollution is a major environmental hazard for Santiago, the
nation's capital. Over one-third of the country's 13.6 million people
reside in and around the metropolitan city.89 As seen in Part II,
Chile's large-scale environmental degradation is the result of an un-
regulated economic system and an immense push for economic
growth. Eventually, the swift growth generated from these elements
spawned rapid urbanization in and around the capital.90 As a result,
high population growth, industrial expansion, and heavy vehicular
traffic have devastated Santiago's air quality.91 In addition, the topog-
raphy and climate of the city itself severely exacerbate Santiago's air
pollution. Santiago is situated at the base of the Andes mountain
range, in a bowl-like configuration at the end of a 625-mile-long val-
ley. Unfortunately, this natural barrier, along with thermal inversions
which create an upper layer of cold air that seals pollutants beneath it,
traps the warmer polluted air in the valley during winter months,
blanketing the city in a thick haze from roughly May to September.
Low rainfall in the area sharpens the pollution problem. Though liter-
ally adjacent to the city, on many days the majestic Andes are not
even visible. Not surprisingly, the level of pollution ranks Santiago
among the world's three worst locations, alongside Mexico City and
Sao Paulo, Brazil.93
89. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
90. See .
91. Id.
92. See Mylrea, supra note 32.
93. Environmental Issues Now Loom Large for Investors, LAGNAPPE LETrER, July 23,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Lagltr File.
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The direct causes of Santiago's noxious air are numerous and va-
ried. A major problem is the particulate material in the air, generated
from industrial and vehicular emissions and unpaved streetsfr4 Until
recently, unregulated industrial smokestacks contributed up to twenty
percent of the toxic emissions in the city.95 By 1992 there were nearly
1500 industrial factories in and around Santiago, the majority of which
operated without pollution control devices. 96 The use of wood-burn-
ing stoves and heaters has also contributed to Santiago's air pollu-
tion-by 1990, more than a million tons of wood were burned each
year.97 Additionally, by 1990 there were an estimated 450,000
automobiles in Santiago, most of which had no smog equipment at
all,9 with the total number of vehicles growing by about 60,000 each
year. 9 Finally, over four hundred miles of unpaved roads stretch
along the outskirts of the city, kicking large amounts of dust into the
air.100
However, the primary cause of Santiago's unhealthy air has been
exhaust emissions from the city's huge armada of privately operated,
unregulated, old, diesel-fueled buses, which have at times numbered
more than 14,000.101 In 1991 Santiago's actual need of buses was seen
as half that number.102 The majority of these old buses burn fuel inef-
ficiently' 013 and they have, at times, released into the air between fifty
to seventy percent of all toxic emissions in Santiago.104 Emission con-
94. Chile's Economic Success Marred by Environmental Disaster, Notimex Mex. News
Service, Jan. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Notimx File.
95. The Bid to (Literally) Clean Up Santiago; Polluted Water Supply and Unbreathable
Air, LArN Am. WKLY. REP., Mar. 26, 1992, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File [hereinafter The Bid to Clean Up Santiago].
96. Gary Marx, City Without a Shield Now Fears the Sun, CHi. TpaB., June 2,1992, at 1.
97. Mylrea, supra note 32.
98. Marx, supra note 61, at 19.
99. William R. Long, Environment; Anti-Smog Efforts Not Working, Say Choking
Chileans, L.A. Tnars, July 24, 1992, at AS.
100. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
101. Id. By way of comparison, in 1992 Sao Paulo, Brazil, with nearly 20 million occu-
pants-approximately four times the population of Santiago-had 7000 buses. Id.
102. Robinson, supra note 30, at A24.
103. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
104. Santiago Can't See or Breathe; Emergency Declared as Smog Reaches Crtical
Levels, LArN AM. WsLy. REP., June 28, 1990, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnews File [hereinafter Santiago Can't See or Breathe]; see also Long, supra note 99, at
A5.
Noise pollution has also been a problem in Santiago, an area where Chile traditionally
has lacked minimum standards. Chile- Santiago Residents Going Deaf From Noise, Inter
Press Service, Feb. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File. Once again,
the main culprits have been the large number of buses and cars. Id. The lack of regulation
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trois did exist on the books, but they were a "mishmash of contradic-
tory, even destructive policies," 10 5 and the lack of government
enforcement made them virtually obsolete. As a result, bus owners
simply did not comply with emissions regulations throughout the pe-
riod of the dictatorship, preferring to pay the rarely enforced low fines
rather than buy expensive emission control equipment.106
2. Consequences
The effects of Santiago's polluted air have been devastating.
Winter has proven to be the most dangerous time of year for those
living in Santiago, when the air quality often reaches critical levels. In
1989, the last year of military control, pollution meters measured air
quality levels in the city as "critical" or "dangerous" on nine separate
days between May and mid-June, with the average register on other
days as "bad. ' 107 Most of the pollution stemmed from diesel bus
emissions known as particulates-hydrocarbons from incompletely
burned fuels.'08 In all, there were only eighty-nine days of "good" air
quality throughout the entire year.'0 9 During the same year, people in
central Santiago, where the smog is heaviest, began donning surgical
masks in an attempt to shield themselves from the contaminated
air.1 0
under the military regime allowed the use of faulty exhaust pipes and worn-out brakes and
permitted the constant use of noisy horns. Id. After many years, these conditions gradu-
ally aggravated the type and level of sound generated by the numerous vehicles. Id. By
1991 a study showed that 80% of the young people in Santiago were in danger of suffering
hearing damage or losing their hearing at varying degrees. Id. The government addressed,
or at least attempted to address, this issue early that year. At that time, the government
began to consider plans to control the noise pollution throughout Santiago. Id. The pro-
posal called for permanent mandatory noise standards for vehicles and buildings. Id. The
proposal also included the creation of an educational campaign to better inform the public
on the need to refrain from making unnecessary noise. Id.
105. Hale, supra note 30.
106. Marx, supra note 61, at 19.
107. Smith, supra note 51, at A33.
108. By way of comparison, the United States Environmental Protection Agency's 1989
standards stated that particulate levels which exceeded more than 150 micrograms per cu-
bic meter were unacceptable. Id. In Chile, any level over 300 micrograms per cubic meter
was considered hazardous. See Santiago's Pollution Reaches Danger Levels, Reuters, June
17,1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File. In Santiago, the levels of particu-
lates at that time often surpassed 500 micrograms per cubic meter. Smith, supra note 51, at
A33. One recording station reached a record level of 878 micrograms per cubic meter on
June 9, 1989. L
109. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
110. Durr, supra note 53, at 6. Unfortunately, Santiago's children have been affected
the worst by the air pollution. They are affected more severely because their underdevel-
oped immune systems cannot effectively expel the particles contained in the smog they
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During the winter of 1990, a severe ongoing draught 11 filled the
air with dust and made conditions particularly brutal.11 Spending
eight hours in the city was equated to smoking twenty cigarettes a day,
and by the end of 1990 the health costs associated with the smog were
estimated at forty to fifty million dollars per year. 13 In all, there were
only about one hundred days of "good" air quality throughout the
year." 4 Eduardo Arriagada, president of CEDRM, the commission
charged with cleaning up Santiago's air pollution, stated that the se-
verity of the pollution during this time had "no precedent" in Chile."'
Health Minister Jorge Jimenez described the pollution in Santiago as
"terrifying" 1 6 and suggested that people who stayed were "commit-
ting collective suicide." 117 The archbishop of the city asked his follow-
ers to pray for rain to alleviate the polluted air."'
Santiago's air quality again reached "dangerous" levels in 1992
and 1993. Thermal inversions were particularly strong in 1992, sealing
the city under a heavy canopy of black smog. In mid-June, pollution
alerts were declared for eight consecutive days."' Children, the eld-
erly, and the sick were advised to stay home, and hospitals were
crammed with children suffering from respiratory ailments. "2 u Ulti-
mately, the winter of 1992 was one of the worst on record. 21 By the
inhale. Id. A 1989 study found that smog-induced respiratory diseases were already the
leading cause of death for children between the ages of one and twelve months in Santiago.
Id. Moreover, children in Santiago were four times more likely to get pneumonia than
children in smaller, unpolluted towns. Id. Another 1989 study found children in Santiago
were three to eight times more likely to have bronchial or lung disease than children in
nearby unpolluted areas. Robinson, supra note 30, at A24. During the same year, private
pediatric clinics reported a 50% increase in cases of child respiratory illness over the previ-
ous year, consequently, hospitals routinely found themselves with bed shortages in their
pediatric centers. Dun, supra note 53, at 6.
111. Rainfall was 80% below average. Santiago Can't See or Breathe, supra note 104.
112. During this time, the particulate level in the air often reached levels betveen 400
and 630 micrograms per cubic meter. See Chile Emergency Pollution Plan Implemented in
Santiago, Inter Press Service, June 20, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres
File. In addition, on two occasions in 1990 the particulate level topped SWO micrograms per
cubic meter. Marx, supra note 61, at 19.
113. Mylrea, supra note 32.
114. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
115. Santiago Can't See or Breathe, supra note 104.
116. Anthony Harrup, Latin America Wakes Up to Pollution Headache, UPI, Oct. IS.
1990, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, UPI File.
117. Marx, supra note 61, at 19.
118. Cleric: Pray for Rain to Clean Air in Chile, Cin. TRIB., July 8, 1990, at 14.
119. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
120. Young, Old and Sick Told to Stay Home as Smog Chokes Santiago, Reuters, July 9,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, TxtnAs File.
121. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
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end of the season, the air pollution had caused many deaths.122 The
arrival of the 1993 winter season signalled the advent of severe air
pollution once again, causing respiratory complications for many of
Santiago's residents. 23
The economic impact of the pollution has been equally severe. A
study released in June 1994 stated that Chile suffered economic losses
of approximately $435 million per year because of Santiago's air pol-
lution. 24 According to the study, the pollution is responsible for caus-
ing thousands of employees to fall ill on a daily basis due to
respiratory complications, with many of them dying.125
3. Government Regulation
By 1991, with the political atmosphere relatively stabilized, the
government began to take a greater interest in Santiago's air pollu-
tion. The government's reaction to Santiago's air pollution took three
main forms. First, as short-term reduction measures, the government
activated emergency procedures on days when the air pollution
reached critical levels. Second, the administration implemented, by
decree, specific long-term regulations aimed directly at the sources of
the pollution. These measures were designed to reduce the level of
pollution substantially over a number of years. Finally, as part of a
long-term environmental plan for Santiago, the government launched
various projects designed to improve the city's infrastructure to re-
duce pollution.
a. Emergency Procedures
When the level of air pollution reached critical levels, the govern-
ment activated emergency procedures aimed at reducing the levels of
pollution quickly and temporarily in order to alleviate its immediate
harmful impact. The government first implemented these types of
procedures during the winter of 1990, when the newly elected govern-
ment issued its first "total ecological alert.' 26 Similar measures were
implemented again in 1992 and 1993.
122. Lucia Newman, Santiago Choking in its Own Pollution (CNN television broadcast,
July 8, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, CNN File.
123. See Lucia Newman, Santiago, Chile, Combats Dangerous Air Pollution Period
(CNN television broadcast, Aug. 5, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, CNN File.
124. Chile-Environment Air Pollution Triggers Big Economic Loss, Inter Press Service,
June 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File.
125. It.
126. Pollution Emergency Declared in Chile, UPI, June 20, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nsamer Library, UPI File.
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The emergency procedures usually restricted specific activities.
The most common restriction was the limitation on vehicular traffic.
During severe conditions, one-fifth of Santiago's automobiles would
be declared nonoperational on a designated business day, based on a
scheme of rotating license plates. 2 7 Cars fitted with catalytic convert-
ers, which curtail hazardous automobile emissions, were held exempt
from the one-day-a-week driving restriction"-S During particularly
severe conditions, forty percent of Santiago's vehicles were ordered
off the road to reduce the level of air pollution.129 In addition to the
large numbers of cars and buses ordered off the streets, heavily pollut-
ing industries were often closed for short periods of time.129 During
the 1992 winter season, emergencies prompted the government to
shut down over one hundred factories.' 3 ' In 1994 severe air pollution
forced the government to close 107 factories for forty-eight hours.'3 2
In addition, schools would occasionally start classes later than usual,
various sporting activities were suspended, 13 3 and nursery schools
were closed. 34 Finally, virtually all emergency programs prohibited
the burning of wood and the use of coal heaters for a designated pe-
riod of time.13
5
b. Regulation by Decree
In addition to emergency procedures, the administration and
CEDRM implemented, by presidential decree, specific regulations
aimed at the sources of Santiago's air pollution. Whereas the emer-
gency procedures attempted to reduce the pollution levels on a tem-
porary basis, these decrees were long-term solutions designed to
reduce the level of air pollution considerably over a number of years.
Near the end of 1991, Aylwin signed Decree 4, which targeted
Santiago's industries by setting new emission standards. In December
1991 CEDRM announced that industries within the Santiago metro-
127. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
128. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
129. See Newman, supra note 122.
130. See Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
131. Smog Forces Shutdowns in Chile's Capital, CHi. TRm., July 10, 1992, at 19.
132. Air Pollution Forces Chile to Close Factories, Prohibit Driving, Clean Air Net%% ark
Online Today, July 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, laenws File.
133. Chile: Emergency Pollution Plan Implemented in Santiago, supra note 112.
134. Smog-Bound Santiago Shuts Nursery Schools, Takes Cars Off Roads, Reuters, July
7, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtn%%s File [hereinafter Smog-Bound Santu3$o
Shuts Nursery Schools].
135. Chile: Emergency Pollution Plan Implemented in Santiago, supra note 112; Smog-
Bound Santiago Shuts Nursery Schools, supra note 134.
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politan area had until December 31, 1992 to comply with the new
emission ceiling regulations136 contained in Decree 4, which took ef-
fect in January 1993.131 The regulations required local and foreign
companies to slash industrial emissions dramatically. Under the pro-
visions of Decree 4, CEDRM's initial goal was to reduce factory dis-
charges in Santiago by twenty percent by 1993.138 As a second stage,
the law required emissions to be reduced by fifty percent by the end of
1996.139 Notably, at the time of the announcement, over 500 indus-
tries in the metropolitan area exceeded the maximum allowable emis-
sion level established by Decree 4.141
With the arrival of 1993, CEDRM cracked down on companies
failing to comply with Decree 4's new emission limitations. By Febru-
ary 1993 the government imposed sanctions on 383 industries which
had not complied with the standards set by the new regulations. 41
Those that failed to submit emission reduction plans by March of that
year were shut down.142 Significantly, Decree 4 was Chile's first step
toward halting the emissions of pollutants by fixed sources.143
Whereas Decree 4 was aimed at fixed industrial emissions, De-
cree 211 targeted the mobile sources of hazardous emissions-the
many automobiles which lacked emission control equipment. In Sep-
tember 1992 the government implemented Decree 211, which made
the use of catalytic converters mandatory immediately for all new cars
registered in Santiago; the remainder of Santiago's automobile owners
had until September 1994 to outfit their vehicles with smog equip-
136. Chile: New Emission Controls for Santiago Metropolitan Area, NoTIsuR, Jan. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Notsur File [hereinafter Chile: New Emission
Controls].
137. Chilean Manufacturers Group Begins Environmental Manager Training, ENV"r
WATCH LATIN AM., June, 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, lacnws File.
138. Chile: New Emission Controls, supra note 136.
139. Environmental Regulations: Chile, Bus. LATIN Am., May 23, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File. Specifically, industries were required to cut emis-
sions to 112 parts per ton (ppt) by 1993, and 56 ppt by 1997. By 1997, tradeable pollution
rights will be available; companies which are above the maximum level will be able to
purchase pollution rights from those that are below the limit, thereby ensuring an average
of 56 ppt for Santiago. Environmental Law; Building and Related Permits, INVESTIN O Li-
CENSING & TRADING, Mar. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiuilt File.
140. Chile New Emission Controls, supra note 136.
141. See Chile: Government to Penalize 383 Polluting Industries, Inter Press Service,
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ment.' 44 The decree made Chile the first Latin American country to
require catalytic converters on all passenger car imports. 145 To en-
force the new regulations, CEDRM completed a two million dollar
emission testing center to randomly check importers' and manufactur-
ers' reported emission levels.146
In addition to Decree 211, the government undertook several
other official actions that were aimed at reducing vehicular pollution.
By 1991 the government had removed 2600 vehicles from Santiago's
massive fleet of circulating buses.147 Buses older than fourteen years
were removed from circulation, and many of the buses remaining in
operation were fitted with converters that reduced gas emissions by
ninety-five percent and particulate materials by seventy-five per-
cent."4 In July 1992, prior to Decree 211, the government issued a
separate decree which exempted buses from mandatory retirement if
they were equipped with proper catalytic converters. 149 By late 1994
CEDRM released new emission regulations for trucks and medium-
sized vehicles.-1 0
c. Municipal Projects
In addition to emergency measures and presidential decrees, the
government considered several projects designed to improve Santi-
ago's infrastructure to reduce pollution. In the first quarter of 1990,
Aylwin organized a panel to study solutions to the air pollution situa-
tion.15 Possible solutions on a municipal level included the return to
an electric transportation system, extending the subway system, and
regulating bus routes to reduce traffic in heavily congested areas.'5 2
144. 2.06 Environmental Law, IVEsrrG LIc: Nsr.o & TRADING, Feb. 1, 1994. aral-
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiuilt File.
145. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
146. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards, supra note 85. In addition, in 1994 the gov-
ernment acquired eight mobile units to enforce vehicle emissions regulations. Government
Says 1994 Watershed Year for Improvements in Santiago's Air Quahty, Itr'L EV.YT REP.
CuRRENr REP., Jan. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intenv File [hcreinafter
Watershed Year]. The mobile units allowed officials to perform roughly 3l,0rXi curbsida
smog checks in 1994, with approximately 25% of the checks resulting in sanctions or %arn-
ings. Id. Heavy trucks were the largest polluters, followed by taxis and buses. Id.
147. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
148. Environmental Issues: Government to Beat Air Pollution, Country Forecast, July
22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiucf File.
149. Long, supra note 99, at A5.
150. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards, supra note 85. CEDRM's previous regula-
tions released in 1992 applied only to passenger cars and buses.
151. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4.
152. Id
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Aylwin's government viewed the expansion of public transportation as
one of the few long-term options available to reduce Santiago's smog
problem. 153 Work on Santiago's third subway line, at a total cost of
$320 million, is scheduled to be finished by the end of 1996.154 In
addition to expanding the subway system, the government sold trans-
portation routes to buses that traveled through the metropolitan area,
favoring those with newer vehicles and lower fares. 155 CEDRM also
sponsored a program to promote the use of bicycles as an alternative
mode of transportation.
5 6
4. Effectiveness of Reforms
In judging the effectiveness of these reforms, it is important to
remember that the air pollution in Santiago was, and still is, extremely
severe. As a result, it will take time to see concrete results. As the
head of CEDRM explained in 1993, "The country as a whole had not
confronted the environment as an issue. Only in the past five or six
years has there been any kind of awakening to environmental
problems.' 1 57 Indeed, the battle against Santiago's air pollution was
still in its early stages under the Aylwin administration.
58
Yet, after the terrible winter of 1992, parties within the ruling co-
alition itself (the Coalition of Parties for Democracy) alleged that
CEDRM was not doing enough to alleviate Santiago's air pollution. "9
Soon many people, from environmentalists to politicians, were criti-
cizing the government's antipollution policies.'60 Many complained
that pollution prevention had not been stressed adequately by the
government. 161 Although emergency measures had at times reduced
the levels of air pollution in the metropolitan area temporarily, critics
argued that they could not solve the overall problem.162 Aylwin ex-
153. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards, supra note 85.
154. Id
155. Larmer, supra note 25, at 41.
156. Chile: Government Aims to Put Capital City on Bikes, Inter Press Service, July 2,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File.
157. Warn, supra note 73, at 41.
158. Id
159. Chile's Ruling Parties Disagree on Pollution Policy, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News
Service, July 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Xinhua File.
160. Long, supra note 99, at AS.
161. Chile's Economic Success Marred by Environmental Disaster, supra note 94.
162. Chile: Government to Penalize 383 Polluting Industries, supra note 141. The emer-
gency and other measures had a noticeable effect, reducing the number of critical level
days: during 1991 the city had only one emergency air quality day, while in 1990 it had six.
See Robinson, supra note 30, at A24. Yet, in other regards, the overall situation was still
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pressed his support for CEDRM and asked those critical of its policy
to offer tangible solutions and alternatives. 63 Appealing for patience
and cooperation, the government stressed that there was no quick
short-term solution to Santiago's smog problem."6  Rather, the gov-
ernment emphasized that the antipollution measures were designed to
achieve clean air quality in Santiago by the end of the decade, not by
the end of Aylwin's term.
1 65
Nevertheless, the government's reforms did achieve discernible
progress in the struggle against Santiago's air pollution. By 1994 regu-
lations put in place by presidential decree and by CEDRM had helped
reduce pollution levels noticeably'66-eighty-five percent of the in-
dustries targeted by Decree 4 complied with the new emission regula-
tions and reduced their emissions by twenty percent by 1993.1"7 The
industries invested an estimated $560 million to adjust to the emission
standards required in 1993, and industries will continue to adopt new
measures to meet the maximum emission norms that will be in effect
after 19 97.16s Unleaded gasoline arrived in Chile in 1992,1(,9 and the
regulations have promoted the use of alternative fuels: they are forc-
ing companies to turn to natural gas, a nonpolluting fuel, in order to
reduce their emissions to meet the new standards set to take effect in
1997.170 Construction of the Trans-Andean gas pipeline, a $1.8 billion
project' 71 between Chile, Argentina, and foreign companies to pro-
vide Chile with natural gas from Argentina, is already under construc-
tion. Chile's partial conversion from coal-fired power stations to
natural gas will help alleviate Santiago's chronic pollution
significantly72
getting worse year by year: during 1991 there were only 69 "good" air quality days, %hich
was less than in 1990 or 19S9. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
163. Chile's Ruling Party Disagrees on Pollution Policy, supra note 159.
164. Newman, supra note 122. For instance, CEDRM's plan implemented in I ", was
designed to reduce pollution in the city by 50% to 60% over the next six to eight yars.
Smog-Bound Santiago Shuts Nursery Schools, supra note 124.
165. Environmental Issues: Government to Beat Air Pollution, supra note 14S.
166. See Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
167. Chile.. Government to Penalize 383 Polluting Industries, supra note 141.
168. Environmental Issues. Government to Beat Air Pollution, supra note 143.
169. Allen Boraiko, Bright Hopes For Chile? Economic Development, IN"'L W L -E,
July 1995, at 36.
170. Margaret Orgill, Chile Gas De Chile Consortium Signs Supply Contracts, Reuter
News Service (Cent. & South Am.), Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File.
171. Id. The Trans-Andean pipeline is Chile's largest energy project. Id.
172. Chile: Chemical Named as Advisor on Trans.Andean Pipeline Project, Reuter
Textline, Aug. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
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Though far from the ultimate goal, by 1992 the administration
had reduced Santiago's air pollution by ten percent.173 The average
particle emissions from fixed sources was reduced from twenty-two
tons per day in 1991, to fifteen tons per day in 1992, and to eight tons
per day in 1993.174 Similarly, the government was tackling pollution
from moving sources effectively. 175 Efforts to make the "well-
equipped but chaotic bus system" more efficient were beginning to
work. 76 For example, the provision that exempted buses from
mandatory retirement if they were equipped with proper catalytic
converters was a success; the leading bus owners' organization in-
stalled converters on its fleet of 5500 buses in 1993.'77
Moreover, in January 1995 government officials declared 1994 a
landmark year in the battle to rid Santiago of its air pollution. 7s Ac-
cording to government officials, air quality, enforcement efforts, and
voluntary compliance all showed "strong improvement in the past 12
months."'179 In 1994 there were eleven "critical" days, as opposed to
twenty-two in 1993, thirty-two in 1990, and thirty-six in 1989. In addi-
tion, 1994 had only one "dangerous" day, as opposed to three in 1993,
seven in 1990, and twelve in 1989.180 Emissions from fixed sources,
mobile sources, and agricultural sources all declined in 1994.181 Ac-
cording to Santiago's environmental health division (SESMA), only
132 of the 3556 registered fixed source factories in the metropolitan
area (3.7%) exceeded the established air pollution standards at any
time during 1994. In 1990 the percentage of those emitters exceeding
emission limits was forty-two percent, and in 1991 it was approxi-
mately twenty percent.'82
Although the administration's reforms have had a positive impact
in curbing Santiago's air pollution, 183 the problem remains serious.lM
4
173. Smog-Bound Santiago Shuts Nursery Schools, supra note 134.
174. Environmental Issues: Government to Beat Air Pollution, supra note 148.
175. Id.
176. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards, supra note 85.
177. Andrew Trimble, Newmarket Firm Cleans Up with Smog-Scrubbing Device, To-
RoNrro STAR, May 25, 1993, at C1.
178. Watershed Year, supra note 146.
179. Id.
180. Id. (statement of Alejandro Coffre, director of fixed source emissions program
operated by Santiago's environmental health division (SESMA)) ("We've gone from a sit-




183. See eg., Maria Rivero, Santiago, UPI, Sept. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, UPI File ("Considerable progress has been made in recent years in removing the
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The real payoff will be in the years to come, when the changes made
under the Aylwin administration achieve their collective goal and rid
Santiago of its poisonous curse permanently.
B. Water Contamination
1. Causes & Severity
Air pollution is not the only severe environmental issue in Chile,
and some observers have noted that the country is "far more back-
ward in matters relating to water pollution."'185 Indeed, water contam-
ination, caused by human and industrial liquid, solid, and toxic waste,
has been a very serious problem for many years, and many experts
have contended that water contamination has posed a greater health
risk to Santiago's inhabitants than the smog.1 ' By 1993 the Ministry
of Health itself had identified Santiago's chief environmental problem
as water contamination, not air pollution.187 Part of the problem
stems from the fact that, until recently, Chile completely lacked water
treatment facilities. In the capital, which had no primary treatment
plant until recently,las waste was dumped directly into the putrid
Mapocho River, described as an "open sewer,' 1 89 which runs straight
through the city."9 According to one 1993 estimate, the city pro-
duced, on average, ten cubic meters of untreated effluent per sec-
ond.19' The Mapocho River has at times carried over a million gallons
of urine and a thousand tons of excrement through Santiago on a daily
basis,' 92 carrying up to sixty percent untreated sewer water."1 3
blackest components of smog such as hydrocarbons, giving residents back some of their
view of the mountains.").
184. Id. (statement of Ignacio Olaeta, manager of the automatic air quality readings in
Santiago) (By 1995, the measurement of airborne particles "was showing a slow but sus-
tained downward tendency. In 1990, we had in all seasons a yearly average of 70 micro-
grams per cubic meter, and in July 1995 the annual average is 45 micrograms par cubic
meter. Although the situation is improving, there are still worrying levels. WYe still exceed
international norms in levels of carbon monoxide, suspended particles, ozone, nitro2en
dioxide and others. Santiago continues to have a serious air pollution problem.").
185. The Business Environment: Erpected to Meet Clean Air Standards by 2000. Coun-
try Forecast, Jan. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiucf File.
186. Nash, supra note 27, at A4; Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
187. Chile. Battle Against Pollution, supra note 43.
188. See Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
189. Chile: Battle Against Pollution, supra note 43.
190. Marx, supra note 61, at 19.
191. Warn, supra note 73, at 41.
192. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment, supra note 34.
193. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9. The severity of the water contamination issue %;as
underscored by the appearance of cholera in 1991, The Bid to Clean Up Santiaco, supra
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In addition to the waterways of Santiago, many of Chile's rivers
have been heavily polluted with industrial and human waste. 1 4 In-
deed, by 1992 Chile was in "dire need of wastewater regulation be-
cause . . . 'there [were] more than 3,000 sources of industrial
wastewater... discharging untreated effluent into rivers, sewer sys-
tems, and other waterways with no government regulation whatso-
ever."' 1 95 A 1993 study revealed that 1591 companies out of 3000
companies surveyed were discharging industrial effluent directly into
the sewage system without any treatment. 196 At times up to eighty
percent of the nation's industries have dumped untreated waste di-
rectly into sewer systems.1" Chile's food processing industry pro-
duces 14.5 million tons of liquid waste per year, of which most was
dumped untreated into the nation's waterways. 198 Other industries
produce four million tons of liquid waste per year and have often be-
haved with similar disrespect for the environment. 99 The mining in-
dustry has also severely contaminated rivers and coastal waters
throughout Chile.2 °°
Finally, massive amounts of waste have ended up in Chile's water
collection system, 0 1 which spreads the contaminated water through-
out many regions of the country. Contaminated waters that flow
through Santiago eventually pass through much of the nation's farm-
lands; by 1990 it was discovered that most of Chile's vegetables were
grown using contaminated irrigation. 02 Moreover, water used by
farmers to irrigate crops on land near Santiago often originated di-
rectly from the polluted metropolitan rivers.20 3 By 1992 water had
note 95, and the fact that the city, by 1992, had one of the highest rates of typhoid and
hepatitis on the South American continent. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9; see also Chile:
Battle Against Pollution, supra note 43.
194. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
195. Chile's First Water Pollution Regulations to be Ready in August, ENV'T WATCH
LATIN AM., July 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter Chile's
First Water Pollution Regulations].
196. Chile Requires Detection Devices for Liquid Industrial Wastes, ENV'T WATCH
LATIN AM., July 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
197. 2.06 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
198. The Business Environment: Expected to Meet Clean Air Standards by 2000, supra
note 185.
199. Id.
200. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
201. Chile Requires Detection Devices for Liquid Industrial Wastes, supra note 196.
202. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
203. Chile: Battle Against Pollution, supra note 43.
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The Aylwin administration took significant steps to address
Chile's water pollution problems. The government, alert to the grow-
ing environmental awareness among Chileans, voiced its intention
early on to work with industries to solve the nation's water
problems.20 5 Jaime Vivanco, director of the Superintendency of Sani-
tary Services (SSS), the agency created in 1990 to clean up and protect
the nation's water supply,20 6 observed that the "Chilean people [were]
becoming very serious about environmental protection."20 17
Not surprisingly, by 1991 CONAMA had discovered that existing
water regulations did not adequately protect public waterways from
industrial or municipal waste and that there was no requirement that
toxic waste be properly treated before disposal20 s Due to bureau-
cratic overlap, about four hundred government bodies had some form
of regulatory jurisdiction over Chile's waterways, making it extremely
difficult to develop a single overall plan for water pollution preven-
tion.2 09 In fact, CONAMA itself had no information on record indi-
cating where toxic waste was being discarded.210 The government
conducted a survey of such waste in 1992.11
After conducting these extensive studies, the SSS released a draft
of Chile's first-ever proposed water regulations.21' To avoid the often
lengthy congressional approval process, officials released the regula-
tions by presidential decree.?13 The administration, through the SSS,
204. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healtv Environment, supra note 34.
205. Chilean Officials Draft Country's First Water Pollution Regulations. Etv'T \VATci
LATiN AM., Jan. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
206. The SSS is a government agency that enforces discharge regulations for industrial
effluent and supervises sanitary service concessions. Chile Requires Detection Devices for
Liquid Industrial Wastes, supra note 196.
207. Chilean O.ficials Draft Country's First Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 205.
208. Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and Plan New Ones, supra note 77.
209. Chile Requires Detection Devices for Liquid Industrial Wastes, supra note 196.
210. Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and Plan New Ones, supra note 77.
See also Nash, supra note 27, at A4 (statement of Eduardo Arriagada, president of
CEDRM) ("We have no idea of where and how much industrial toxic waste is being
dumped. It could be anywhere. We assume a lot goes into rivers but we just don't
know.").
211. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
212. Chilean Officials Draft Country's First Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 205.
213. Chile's First Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 195.
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officially implemented the new water regulations in October 1992.214
Modelled after those used in developed countries, the water regula-
tions were intended to affect every aspect of the nation.215 The regu-
lations put the SSS in charge of enforcement, and they banned or
limited discharges of more than thirty hazardous substances-particu-
larly heavy metals and chlorine compounds-from industrial effluent
and municipal sewage.216 The standards distinguished between efflu-
ent released into sewer systems and effluent released directly into riv-
ers and other water systems. 217 Although existing industries were
given four years to comply with the regulations, newly constructed fa-
cilities were required to comply with the regulations immediately. t2 1
In addition to these discharge regulations, the SSS also put into
effect Law 1333, which further limited disposals of putrid matter,
heavy metals, and floating solids.219 In 1993 the SSS received ap-
proval from Congress to fine companies for violations of effluent dis-
charge limits.220 The SSS also declared that industries releasing
treated or untreated waste into either sewer systems or waterways
were required to install new monitoring devices to oversee effluent
discharges properly.221 The SSS based this requirement on a law that
required companies to disclose information about their effluent
discharges.22
3. Effectiveness of Regulations
Experts believed these regulations would compel most cities to
build sewage treatment plants within ten years and force most indus-
tries to install treatment facilities for liquid discharges.3 As pre-
dicted, the regulations have had a positive impact in both the private
214. Chile's Water Pollution Regulations Put in Place, ENV'T WATCH LATIN Aht., Nov.
1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File. The technical regulations were
officially approved shortly thereafter in February 1993 by the National Institute of Stand-
ardization (INN), an agency which reviews all technical regulations and has the power to
change them. Chile Requires Detection Devices for Liquid Industrial Wastes, supra note
196.
215. Chile's First Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 195.
216. Id.
217. Id. The standards for effluent discharged into sewer systems were more stringent
because certain substances could cause problems for the city's planned sewage treatment
facilities. Id.
218. Chile's Water Pollution Regulations Put in Place, supra note 214.
219. 2.06 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
220. Chile Requires Detection Devices for Liquid Industrial Wastes, supra note 196.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Chile's First Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 195.
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and public sector.2"4 By 1992 the government was building a collector
system for Santiago to deal with the city's sewage problems, with
treatment plants to follow.-5 By 1992, for the first time in the coun-
try's history, several water treatment facilities were under construc-
tion in Chile.2 6 Most importantly, by 1993 the government was
completing its first primary treatment plant in Santiago, though it will
take at least a decade and extensive investment before Santiago as a
whole possesses an effective treatment system.- 7 By mid-1993 gov-
ernment officials were planning a new $800 million sewage treatment
plan for Santiago, Chile's largest effort at the time in its battle against
contamination. 2 s8 A smaller treatment facility was being planned for
the Maipo river to treat seven percent of Santiago's sewage. 2 In ad-
dition, in February 1995 Empresa de Servicios Sanitarios de Valpara-
iso (ESVAL), the company overseeing water treatment in the coastal
Valparaiso region, announced it would begin a $300 million program
to monitor water pollution along the coast.=9 The program aimed to
reduce the level of pollution around Vifia del Mar and Refiaca, two of
Chile's most popular tourist areas, by treating industrial and munici-
pal waste that drained into the coastal region.3 1
Like Santiago's emission regulations, the overall effectiveness of
Chile's water regulations remains to be seen. Although the changes
themselves are monumental for Chile, there remains a long road to
224. In the private sector, for example, a major pulp and paper manufacturer, Compa-
fifa Manufacturera de Papeles y Cart6nes SA (CMPC), which discharged untreated efflu-
ent containing suspended particles (such as fibers, cellulose, ink pigments, etc.) into the
Maipo river (which downstream agricultural areas were using for irrigation). soon invested
$3.3 million to construct a primary treatment facility at its plant, located adjacent to Santi-
ago. Chilean Paper Manufacturer, Anticipating Regulations, Builds Wastewater Trctanwnt
Plant, ENV'T WATCH LATI Am., Mar. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, lacnws
File. With such a facility, effluent discharge will have 90% to 95% fewer suspended parti-
cles. Id. Company officials acknowledged they were building the facility because of the
water regulations. Id.
225. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
226. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
227. Warn, supra note 73, at 41. By mid-1993, the capital treated only 3% of its sewaze,
dumping the rest into rivers that carried the waste to the ocean. Chile: Battle Against
Pollution, supra note 43.
228. Chile: Battle Against Pollution, supra note 43. Empresa Metropolitana de Obras
Sanitarios (EMOS), the nation's water utility company, solicited foreign and local investors
to finance, build, and operate the facility. Id. One reason the government wanted private
investors was so it could finance other environmental projects in other affected areas. ld.
229. Id.
230. Chile Begins Environmental Clean Up, Monitoring Project in Coastal Waters,
ENV'T WATcH L -N Am., Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
231. Id.
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achieving a safe water supply in general. Chile just started building
water treatment plants in recent years, and only a tiny proportion of
the waste was being treated as of 1994.231 Moreover, as in other areas
of degradation, the sheer cost of cleaning up Chile's water supply will
make it increasingly difficult for Chile to act quickly and comprehen-
sively. In 1991 cleaning up Santiago's water system alone was esti-
mated at a cost of $500 million.3 3 Cleaning up the pollution in Chile's
rivers, lakes and shorelines, ostensibly a tougher task than tackling
Chile's air pollution, will cost over four billion dollars.234
C. Mining & Metallurgical Industries
Chile's mining industries, which exploit the country's large supply
of mineral resources, including copper, iron ore, and nitrates, have
caused serious environmental problems throughout the nation. In
particular, the copper industry, Chile's economic backbone, has con-
taminated many of Chile's resources, including its air, water, and soil.
Most damage stems from liquid discharges dumped into waterways
and hazardous emissions, such as arsenic and sulfur dioxide, released
into the atmosphere. Interestingly, since the copper mines responsible
for most of the pollution are state-owned and are the largest contribu-
tors to the country's total revenue,23 5 environmental reform in this
area has been particularly sensitive to pressure for economic growth
and the availability of financial resources to pay for costly cleanup
programsz 6 and expensive technology.237 More than in any other
field, the government has had to reconcile its need to encourage prof-
232. The Business Environment: Expected to Meet Clean Air Standards by 2000, supra
note 185.
233. Nash, supra note 17, at 6.
234. Chile: Moving Towards Greener Pastures, Bus. LAnN AM., Apr. 25, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File; 2.06 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
235. For example, as the biggest company and exporter in Chile, Corporaci6n Nacional
del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO) produces up to 13% of the world's copper, generates up
to 20% of the government's annual income, and provides nearly one-third of Chile's total
exports. Leslie Crawford, Business and the Environment: Putting a Lid on Chile's Chim-
neys-The Slow Process of Cleaning Up the World's Biggest Copper Mine, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1993, at 10.
236. For instance, because CODELCO has an enormous impact on the country's over-
all economic activity, the government has directed CODELCO to stagger its environmen-
tal programs due to the danger that clean up expenditures could inhibit the economy. Id.
237. Under the military, for example, very little money-in the case of CODELCO as
little as 0.2% of its profits-was ever reinvested back into the state corporations. Chile:
$100 Million Investment in Pollution Control, EXPORT SALES PROSPECrOR, July 1992. As a
result, the lack of investment, coupled with the military's lack of regulation, left virtually
all facilities with severely antiquated technology. See id.
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itable growth in the copper industry with its new commitment to
cleaning up the environment.238 Indeed, the government has had to
operate as the mining industry's environmental regulator while, at the
same time, owning the worst polluters?239
1. Hazardous Emissions
Chile's giant copper industry generates tremendous amounts of
hazardous emissions. TWo byproducts of the copper smelting process
are arsenic and sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions ? 40 Both substances are
extremely toxic and present grave health concerns when released
freely into the atmosphere, as was standard procedure in Chile. By
1992 Chile, with less than fourteen million people, ranked tenth in the
world for sulfur dioxide emissions2 41
The damage caused by the lack of regulation and shortage of
emission control equipment has been quite extensive, especially in the
fertile Central Valley, home to three-fourths of Chile's population and
the metropolitan area of Santiago. Geographically, this region con-
tains several metallurgical facilities that aggravate Santiago's air pollu-
tion. Specifically, the area has been harmed by sulfur dioxide
emissions from the Caletones copper smelter, located south of Santi-
ago, while Molymet and Carbomet, located on the southern end of
Santiago, burn molybdenite and produce ferrosilicon and ferromoly,
hazardous substances which yield toxic byproducts2 42 In 1991
Molymet, a metals refinery, and Chilgener, with its coal-fired power
plant, discharged ninety-five percent of the sulfuric gas present above
Santiago.243 Along Chile's coast, west of Santiago, the large Ventanas
refinery has operated without sulfur dioxide or arsenic removal facili-
ties for decades,244 its antiquated equipment spewing noxious emis-
sions into the surrounding atmosphere 45 Because of the emissions
238. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
239. Crawford, supra note 235.
240. Almost all the minerals extracted from the Andes in Chile are rich in arsenic con-
tent. R D. Crozier, Chile's Legacy-Pollution, MINING J., Aug. 24, 1990, at 10, avadable in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Minjnl File.
241. Achieving World Class as a Polluter, supra note 75, at 11.
242. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10
243. The Bid to Clean Up Santiago, supra note 95.
244. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10.
245. Nash, supra note 27, at A4. A study conducted by the Aylwin administration
showed that some residents of a town near the Ventanas smelter had four times the safe
level of arsenic in their bodies. Robinson, supra note 30, at A24. Farmers living miles
away from the plant have complained of health afflictions, loss of yield in fields, and live-
stock illnesses, all believed to be associated with the pollution. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
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released by the Ventanas smelter, arsenic is present along Chile's most
popular and crowded beaches.246 Overall, sulfur dioxide and arsenic
emissions have polluted the surrounding areas at most mine sites.
2 47
Chile's Chuquicamata mine, located in the arid Atacama Desert
in northern Chile, produces most of the copper in Chile and is the
largest developed copper mine in the world. 48 The enormous
amounts of arsenic released by this smelter have caused health
problems among hundreds of plant workers.249 In 1987 the release of
arsenic around the mining camp alarmed the hospital staff and re-
sulted in all personnel being relocated to nearby Calama.2 50 Prior to
the enactment of emissions regulations, Chuquicamata operated with
fourteen furnaces, its stacks spewing more than 750 tons of sulfur di-
oxide per day into the atmosphere, along with untold amounts of arse-
nic and particulate matter.2 1
2. Toxic Materials
In addition to hazardous emissions, the mining industry's unregu-
lated discharge of toxic materials has also caused extensive environ-
mental damage throughout Chile. Liquid waste and solid material
discharged into rivers have poisoned much of the country's water sup-
ply,"~ and the industry has "destroyed entire valleys and river ba-
sins." 3 For example, Corporaci6n Nacional del Cobre de Chile
(CODELCO), the largest state-owned copper company in Chile and
the largest copper producer in the world, operated a facility in Salva-
dor that dumped its "cyanide-, sulphate-, and mercury-laden waste"
into the sea near Chafiaral, in northern Chile, for sixty years,254 creat-
ing a "vast encrustation of white sediment ... that flows into the
Also, the smelter's workers have been exposed to high amounts of hazardous gases. Id.
See also Air Pollution Laws For Mines, Smelters Will Meet Global Standards Within Dec-
ade, INT'L ENV'T REP. CURRENT REP., Dec. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
Intenv File [hereinafter Air Pollution Laws For Mines] ("The Ventanas smelter, about one
hour north of Vitia del Mar, Chile's main beach resort, is famous for its tall tower belching
black smoke 365 days a year.").
246. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10.
247. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
248. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10.
249. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
250. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10.
251. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10 ("Miles before reaching Chuquicamata's huge
crater, you can spot the world's biggest copper mine by tracing the pall of sulphurous smog
across the cloudless sky.").
252. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
253. Larmer, supra note 25, at 41.
254. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4.
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ocean." 5  Also, for decades the Inforsa plant has seeped mercury
into the Bfo-Bfo River, a premier white water rafting river located
south of Santiago, only switching to cleaner equipment in 1991.56 In
August 1992 the Chilean Supreme Court ruled against one company,
Cia Mineria del Pacifico (CMP), in a suit over air and water pollution
in northern Chile.257 The court found CMP had caused "irreversible"
damage to Chapaco Bay, where the facility had been discharging its
industrial waste for over thirteen years.Ss The court also found that
the company's pellet plant had contaminated the air and adversely
affected production in the area's olive industry. 5 9
Many of the refineries have tailings dams which pollute rivers
with toxic effluents.2 60 For instance, CODELCO used to dump un-
treated tailings directly into rivers and the ocean. : ll By 1990, heavy
metal leakage from the Andina tailings dam was polluting the Acon-
cagua River, located in the Aconcagua Valley north of Santiago'
62
The Aconcagua Valley is Chile's main grape growing district, and the
river irrigates most of the vineyards in the region 63 The Cachapoal
and Maule Rivers, located south of Santiago and used to irrigate apple
orchards, had visible metal contamination from the El Teniente tail-
ings dam by the same year.2
3. Decree 185
Similar to Decree 4, which was aimed at industrial emissions in
the Santiago area, the Aylwin administration implemented regulations
targeting Chile's industrial and metallurgical facilities. In 1991 Aylwin
signed the pivotal Decree 185, developed by the interministerial com-
mittee headed by the Ministry of Mines. 65 The regulations contained
255. Nash, supra note 27, at A4.
256. Achieving World Class as a Polluter, supra note 75, at 11.




260. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10; see also Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile: Indigenous Peo-
ple Get Help to Save Ecosystem, Inter Press Service, July 29, 1994. available in LEXIS,
Nsamar Library, Inpres File (stating that local communities did not have the ability by
themselves to stop pollution from toxic mine tailings).
261. Air Pollution Laws For Mines, supra note 245.
262. Crozier, supra note 240, at 10.
263. Id
264. Id
265. Air Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers As New S0 2 and Particulate Emissions
Regulations Take Effect, ENV' WATCH LAxrm AM., Mar. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, Iacnas File [hereinafter Air Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers].
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in Decree 185 took effect in March 1992.266 The purpose of Decree
185 was to limit emissions and force companies to establish decontam-
ination plans for existing plants.2 67 The law therefore fixed ceilings on
sulfur, arsenic, and particulate emissions.2 68 Since the law was based
on the standards of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, it contained levels as strict or stricter than those used by the
United States.269 The decree basically sliced the country in half: the
levels for industries in the region south of Santiago (which is located
in central Chile) have stricter standards than those in the less-popu-
lated northern region.270 Decree 185 principally targeted the copper
industry because copper smelters were responsible for ninety percent
of sulfur dioxide emissions in Chile.271
Decree 185 was designed to reduce hazardous emissions at indus-
trial, mining, and metallurgical plants by 1999.272 Thus, it allows most
plants to decrease emissions gradually over time, with the exact time
allowed depending on the individual facility itself.273 Most companies
had to be in full compliance with the emission limits by December
1992.274 The law gives the worst offenders an extended timetable to
reduce their emissions to acceptable levels.275 In the case of Chuqui-
camata, such a reduction is expected to take at least until 1998 due to
financial constraints.276
4. Effectiveness of Decree 185
Prior to the official release of the new regulations, experts pre-
dicted that most of the smelters in the northern part of Chile, where
266. Chile: $100 Million Investment in Pollution Control, supra note 237. The regula-
tions were first approved by the General Controller of the Republic, a separate agency that
reviews the constitutionality of decrees and laws before they may be implemented. Air
Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers, supra note 265.
267. Chile: $100 Million Investment in Pollution Control, supra note 237.
268. Achieving World Class as Polluter, supra note 75.
269. See Chile Cracks Down on S0 2 Emissions from the Mining Industry, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN AM., Dec. 1991, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
270. The northern region's limit was set at a maximum of 365 micrograms per cubic
meter of air, while the southern region had a stricter limit of 260 micrograms per cubic
meter of air. Air Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers, supra note 265.
271. Chile Cracks Down on SO2 Emissions from the Mining Industry, supra note 269.
272. Chilgener SA Submits International Bid for Emissions Treatment Equipment,
ENV'T WATCH LATN AM., Oct. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, lacnws File
[hereinafter International Bid].
273. 1d
274. Air Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers, supra note 265.
275. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10.
276. Id.
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most of the mining occurs, would have to be equipped with emission
control equipment for the first time in order to comply with new limi-
tations.277 Equally important, most of the industries in the southern
part of the country, where farming, cattle ranching, and forestry activi-
ties occur, would be required to construct much more expensive sulfu-
ric acid plants to comply with the stricter standards2 78
As predicted, the heaviest polluters were soon forced to under-
take mammoth cleanup programs2 79 CODELCO was required to
submit a detailed decontamination plan for its huge mine at Chuqui-
camata by the end of 199180 By July 1992 CODELCO was studying
which types of furnaces would minimize the adverse effects on the
environment at the Chuquicamata facility 1s The plan included the
construction of a third oxygen plant and the replacement of two old
boilers with newer furnaces38 By 1993 CODELCO was implement-
ing the costliest8 cleanup plan ever undertaken in Chile in order to
bring Chuquicamata within the limits set by the regulations.2'1 Once
complete, the plan will reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by sixty per-
cent and arsenic emissions by ninety percent s-8 By January 1993 two
new furnaces had reduced sulfur dioxide emissions from the levels of
the mid-1980s by fifty percent.2 6 Five electrostatic precipitators,
which collect the arsenic and dust particles released by the smelting
process, were also installed.287 In addition, in November 1993 the
government opened a new sulfuric acid plant to reduce hazardous
emissions flowing from the smelter.2ss
The new regulations also forced CODELCO to study the con-
struction of an eighty million dollar sulfuric acid plant at its Caletones
smelter in 1993V89 By 1994 the Caletones smelter's pollution abate-
ment project was estimated at a total cost of $120 million. By the end
277. Chile Cracks Down on S0 2 Emissions from the Mining Industry, supra note 269.
278. Id These plants capture sulfur dioxide emissions and transform them into sulfuric
acid, which cause less atmospheric contamination. Id.
279. Id
280. Id
281. See Chile's National Copper Company to Install Cleaner Technolo,,y E .VT
WATCH LAn'N Amt., July 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
282. Id.
283. The estimated cost was $300 million. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10.
284. Id.
285. Environmental Issues Now Loom Large for Investors, supra note 93.
286. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10.
287. Id
288. Alejandro Kirk, Chile: Gas Recycling Plant to Protect Environment and Miners,
Inter Press Service, Nov. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres ile.
289. Environmental Issues Now Loom Large For Investors, supra note 93.
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of 1993 CODELCO had developed a new treatment system, designed
to produce nonhazardous water from the byproducts of the copper
extraction process, for its large smelter at El Teniente, just outside
Santiago.2 ° Significantly, by the end of 1993, CODELCO was plan-
ning to spend fifteen to twenty percent of its investment budget
(roughly ninety million dollars per year) on environmental projects
annually for several years.29'
Simultaneously, Chile's other state-owned copper company, Em-
presa Nacional De Mineria (ENAMI), was considering the feasibility
of replacing old furnaces with modern equipment at two of its large
facilities, Ventanas and Paipote, to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions to
comply with the new emission regulations. 29 In addition to cleaner
burning ovens, ENAMI's plan also involved the construction of a sul-
furic acid plant at the coastal Ventanas facility.2 9 3 In 1993 ENAMI
considered reducing its smelting capacity at Ventanas to meet the sul-
fur dioxide emission limitations set by Decree 185.294 Although the
reduction would substantially decrease the plant's capacity to treat
copper concentrates, sulfur dioxide emissions would be reduced sixty
percent by 1998.295 Like other environmental control programs, the
costs of these projects were considerable. 296 In mid-1995 ENAMI
launched its sixty million dollar plan to renovate and clean up the Pai-
290. Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6. CODELCO's newest mines, El Abra and
Radomiro Tomic, will use heap leaching, an emission free process that uses sulfuric acid to
produce copper cathodes. Air Pollution Laws For Mines, supra note 245.
291. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10; Warn, supra note 73, at 41.
292. Chile's National Mining Company Modernizes Smelters to Cut SO2 Emissions,
ENV'T WATcH LATIN AM., Dec. 1991, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
ENAMI's reduction plan for the Ventanas smelter required that particulate emissions be
reduced to below 3400 tons per year starting in 1994; by 1998, emissions must drop below
2000 tons per year, with the final allowable emissions level at 1000 tons per year. Interna-
tional Bid, supra note 272. ENAMI also agreed to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from
62,000 tons per year to 20,000 tons per year by 1998. Id
293. Mission of British Environmental Consultants Visits Chile, ENV'T WATcH LATIN
Am., Aug. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
294. Environmental Issues Now Loom Large for Investors, supra note 93.
295. Id
296. The project at the Ventanas smelter was estimated at a cost of $46 million. Id. The
project for the Paipote smelter was estimated at a cost of $60 to $90 million. Chile-
Smelter Pollution Control Project, MKr. REP., Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, Mktrpt File. In 1995 the total estimated cost for the projects at Ventanas and
Paipote was approximately $100 million. Air Pollution Laws For Mines, supra note 245.
Overall, by the end of 1993, the Ministry of Mining announced that the government
planned to invest roughly $800 million over the next ten years to end the pollution flowing
from the smelters at Antofagasta, Ventanas, Caletones, and Paipote. Chile-Smelter Pollu-
tion Control Project, supra.
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pote smelter.2 97 The plan is designed to comply with the govern-
ment's order that Paipote reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by fifty
percent and arsenic emissions by approximately seventy percent.'
Although the project was originally estimated to take five years to
complete,299 the project is now scheduled to be completed by Decem-
ber 1998 because ENAMI was able to purchase a nine million dollar
second-hand sulfuric acid plant.3°°
In addition to the large copper corporations, other companies
have also implemented abatement programs in response to Decree
185. In December 1992 a major cement manufacturer, Cementos
Melon SA, installed expensive emission equipment to ensure emis-
sions were within the limits permitted by the new regulations"I The
Chilean Company of Electric Generation, Chilgener SA, also submit-
ted a plan to reduce emissions from its thermoelectric plant in
Ventanas, as was required by the decree z2 In late 1993 Chilgener
began preparations to build two new seven million dollar electrostatic
filters, designed to reduce particulate emissions, at its thermoelectric
plant.303 Pursuant to the emission reduction plan, the first filter was
installed at the beginning of 1994, and the second filter will be in-
stalled this year.304
As seen from these examples, Decree 185 has already had a
profound impact on the mining industry 0 s Specifically, by mid-1994
a total of fourteen sulfuric acid plants had been built to reduce smelter
297. Chile's ENAMI Begins Clean-Up of Paipote Smelter, Reuter News Service, Apr. 4,
1995, available in LEXS, News Library, Txtnws File.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Chil Chile's ENAMI to Speed Up Paipore Clean-Up, Reuter News Serice, May
16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnms File. The week before ENAMI an-
nounced that it would expedite its Paipote project, the emissions from the smelter regis-
tered over 32 times higher than the legal limit. Id. At least 20 people %ere hospitalized
because of the hazardous emissions. Chile; ENAMI Could Close Paipore If Pollution Too
High, Reuter News Service, May 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
301. Chilean Cement Plant Installs Air Emissions Monitoring System, Et Vr NVATcH
LATrN Az., Jan. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
302. International Bid, supra note 272. Under the cleanup plan, Chilgener was required
to reduce its particulate emissions to 26,000 tons a year in 1994 and to 3000 tons per year in
1995. Id. To show compliance, the plan also required Chilgener to install a continuous




305. See Air Pollution Laws For Mines, supra note 245 ("ITlhe presidential decrees that
have been written over the past decade or so aimed at specific pollutants have had an effect
on mining already.").
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emissions.3 °6 Yet, more than any other environmental issue, rapid
progress in halting environmental damage from the state-dominated
mining industry is difficult because the rate of reform is directly dic-
tated by the government's budgetary constraints. In 1994 the total
costs for CODELCO and ENAMI were estimated at one billion dol-
lars.307 The sheer cost of reform in the mining sector will delay its
overall pace considerably, and the "Chilean government is deliber-
ately making a gradual transformation toward greater environmental
protection."3 As Chuquicamata's environmental officer acknowl-
edged in 1993, "If we had the resources, we could solve Chuquica-
mata's pollution problems in two years.
' '3°
D. Deforestation
In addition to air pollution and water contamination, much of
Chile's native forests have been destroyed through overexploita-
tion.31° Chile's native species include coigue, roble, alerce, araucaria,
and rauli, all hardwoods.3  Chile's native forests are among the
world's last remaining cold-temperate rain forests, which are found on
the coasts of Alaska and British Columbia, in parts of Siberia, and in
the Pacific Northwest. The trees reach great size but grow very
slowly, and during the Pinochet years there was a strong incentive to
clear cut the native forests and replenish the supply with fast-growing
exotics, such as Monterey Pine from California.312 Although replant-
ing with exotics increased the harvest cycle two or three times, most of
the indigenous biodiversity was eradicated.313
Because of the push for rapid economic growth and the lack of
effective regulatory controls, the logging industry has caused major
306. R. D. Cozier, Chile, MINiNG ANN. REV., July 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, Allnws File.
307. 2.06 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
308. Air Pollution Laws For Mines, supra note 245 (statement of Janett Maritano, chief
of the Mining Ministry's environment unit) ("We cannot take on the costs of adopting such
stringent regulations from one day to the next, but we are aware that eventually our legis-
lation must be compatible with international trends.").
309. Crawford, supra note 235, at 10.
310. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment, supra note 34.
311. Forestry Law Being Developed to Save Native Trees, Promote Sustainable Uses,
INT'L ENV'T REP. CuuRE'r REP., Feb. 8, 1995, at 116, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
Intenv File.
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deforestation in Chile.3 14 By 1991 concern over the depletion of
Chile's native forests was rapidly increasing because of large foreign
demand for chips to produce paper, particle board, and other wood
products.31 Indeed, in 1993 Chile's exports in timber exceeded more
than $1.2 billion, of which $137 million represented wood chip ex-
ports. 3 16 In 1994 Chile's forest exports increased thirty percent.31 7 By
1994 Chile was the third largest wood chip producer in the world,
trailing only the United States and Australia.318 By early 1995, the
National Flora and Fauna Defense Committee (CODEF), a nongov-
ernmental environmental organization, reported that Chile's native
forests were being eradicated at a rate equal to ten football fields
every thirty minutes. 1 9 In August 1995 Chile's Central Bank submit-
ted a report to the Senate Commission on the Environment which
warned that Chile's 6.5 million hectares of native forests could be
completely exhausted in twenty-five to thirty years, or at least reduced
to 1.5 million hectares?20 In addition to the timber industry, poverty
314. See Marx, supra note 61, at 19; see also Environmental Events in Latin America,
1995,6 COLO. J. INT'L ENvr. L. & PoL'v 367, 387 (1995) ("Heavy deforestation of Chile's
forests is blamed on increased forest industry exports, producers' lack of knowledge about
better logging practices, and insufficient state controls over illegal logging.").
315. See Environmental Law, INmV.sIrNG LicENsiNG & TRADG, Mar. 1, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiuilt File. For example, in 1992 Chile earned SI billion
for timber exports. Hale, supra note 30. Large amounts of chips have been shipped to
Japan, Europe, and the United States. Since 1987, suppliers of Japan's paper industry have
built 56 processing plants in Chile to convert hardwoods into wood chips; in 1993 the plants
exported roughly two million tons of chips. Laurie Goering, Clear-Cut Disaster: Chile's
Ancient Forests Reverberate with the Sound of Giants Falling to Meet the Global Demand
for Wood Products, Ci. TRm., Dec. 20, 1994, at Cl [hereinafter Clear-Cut Disaster]; see
also Boraiko, supra note 169, at 36 ("Since 19S6, chip shipments have skyrocketed to more
than 600,000 tons annually. With other wood products, chips have made forestry Chile's
second-largest foreign-exchange earner, after copper .... "); Forestry Law Being Devel-
oped to Save Native Trees, Promote Sustainable Uses, supra note 311, at 116 (-Environmen-
talists say turning limited supplies of unique forest into more than 3 million tons of chips
each year, most of which will be used for particle board and fax paper, is immoral.").
316. David Pilling, Business and die Environment The Chips Are Down-A Look at
the Growing Controversy Surrounding Chile's Booming Forestry Industry, FIN. TIMEs.,
Aug. 24, 1994.
317. Environmental Events in Latin America, 1995, supra note 314, at 3S7.
318. Clear-Cut Disaster, supra note 315, at C1.
319. Chile-Environmen Ecologist Groups Fight Forestry Industry, Inter Press Ser-
vice, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File; see also Forestry Law
Being Developed to Save Native Trees, Promote Sustainable Uses, supra note 311 (state-
ment of Hernan Verscheure, coordinator of forestry programs for CODEF) ("Right now
the forest is being systematically destroyed.").
320. Chile-Environment Central Bank to Provide Regular Updates, supra note 61; see
also Chile, Forest Fire, THm EcoNoris', Feb. 3, 1996, at 37 (-These [projections] suggest
that, given the primitive methods of forest management still common in Chile-%%holesala
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also poses a substantial threat to Chile's native forests-the continu-
ous gathering of firewood has caused considerable damage to the pre-
cious resource. 321
Due to heavy logging for pulp or wood chips, Chile's unique ar-
aucaria trees faced extinction as the Aylwin administration took of-
fice.3" One of the Earth's oldest life forms, the araucaria tree can live
up to 2000 years.32 Acting quickly, President Aylwin outlawed the
cutting of the araucaria within his first month of office. 324 Yet, other
trees have remained vulnerable due to the lack of a coherent timber
policy325 or illegal harvesting.326 For example, the larch tree, also
known as the alerce cedar, has been illegally harvested.327 Living up
to 3000 years, the larch is one of the world's oldest life forms and one
of the rarest trees in Chile.328 In mid-1995 Chilean officials fined a
landowner for cutting down seventy-six old larch trees which were on
the landowner's property.329
Similarly, the Fundo Venecia case, which involved the illegal log-
ging of ten 1000-year-old alerce trees on private land, catalyzed public
awareness about Chile's native forests.310 Although the trees are re-
garded as national treasures, under the old laws the government was
able to impose only token fines .3 3  This case influenced the creation
cutting and burning, without reforestation-there might be no trees left worth felling
within 25-30 years. At best, only half the present 7 million hectares (17.5 million acres) of
native woods would remain for productive use."). A report conducted by Chile's Austral
University found that the remaining forests in the Valdivia region may survive for only 25
years more. Chilean Environmentalists Start Hotline, UPI, Dec. 25, 1995, available In
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, UPI File. Similarly, the forest industry commissioned a study
from France's state forest agency to acquire a certificate of good management for exports
of lenga wood. Chil Forest Fire, supra. The report was "scathing about Chilean forest
management and the lack of effective state control. [The] report accused the industry of
treating forests like mines, to be worked and then abandoned. At present rates of ex-
ploitation, it concluded, the lenga woods would last no more than 20-30 years." Id.
321. Hale, supra note 30.
322. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4.
323. Chile-Environment Ecologist Groups Fight Forestry Industry, supra note 319.
324. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4.
325. Robinson, supra note 30, at A24.
326. Hale, supra note 30.
327. Id.
328. Illegal Logging Threatens Ancient Chilean Trees, Reuters, Apr. 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File. Although only larch trees felled prior to 1976 can be
exported legally, wood stocks have failed to decrease appropriately. Id. As a result, in
1995 CONAF's executive director reported that there was evidence of a growing black
market for the larch. Id.
329. Id.
330. Shapiro, supra note 312.
331. Id,
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of a new law, the Native Forest Recuperation and Support Law, to
protect Chile's native forests, but the legislation has been stuck in
Congress for the last three years.332 The proposed law would give the
National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) broad powers to regulate
forestry on private land.3 33 According to CONAF, its upgraded role
would benefit eleven endangered, twenty-six vulnerable, and thirty-
two rare species of plants and animals.3" Private land owners and the
timber industry, of course, have lobbied against the new law.-3 5 Envi-
ronmental groups like CODEF are fighting to have much of Chile's
native forests classified as "preserved forests" or "protected forests,"
where cutting is not permitted. 36 The forestry industry is pushing to
have most of Chile's forests classified as "productive forest," which
permits cutting and substitution with non-native species.
37
Earlier this year the government submitted a new draft law on
the regulation of Chile's native forests, asking Congress for urgent ac-
tion?38 However, no official action as been taken as of this writing.
Unlike other areas of environmental degradation, the government has
not adequately confronted the deforestation dilemma, and the debate
over the country's critical native forests is likely to emerge as Chile's
chief environmental issue of the near future. 39
E. Fauna Depletion & Habitat Destruction
In August 1991 a group of Chilean scientists warned that most of
Chile's wild fauna were in danger.3n0 The primary causes were cap-
332. Chile, Forest Fire, supra note 320, at 37; see also Forestry Law Bemg Developed to
Save Native Trees, Promote Sustainable Uses, supra note 311, at 116 (-The battle over the
controversial Native Forest Recuperation and Support Law, first proposed in 1991, has
come to symbolize the varied interpretations of resource exploitation held by govcrnment,
businesses, and environmental lobbies.").
333. Shapiro, supra note 312.
334. Id
335. ld.
336. Forestry Law Being Developed to Save Native Trees, Promoted Sustawable Uses.
supra note 311, at 116.
337. Id.
338. Chile, Forest Fire, supra note 320, at 37.
339. See eg., Clear-Cut Disaster, supra note 315, at C1 (-Chileans are slo,.ly beginning
to realize the problems associated with the cutting of their native woods, vhizh now sur-
vive only on steep mountainsides and remote islands .... Following a six-month education
campaign ... more than 80% of Santiago residents now believe the country's native vxoais
are in grave danger and support restrictions to protect them, according to a poll commis-
sioned by the Defenders of the Chilean Forest.").
340. Chile's Wild Fauna Threatened, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, Aug. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Xinhua File.
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ture for commercial use, pollution of the environment, and the overall
destruction of their habitats." 1 The scientists concluded that of the
243 species of vertebrates 342 in Chile, only six of them were not in
danger, with the rest either "in danger," "vulnerable," or "rare.
3 43
By 1993 the huemul, an Andean deer, was in danger of extinction due
to deforestation. 34 The huemul is one of Chile's national symbols
and is depicted on the country's coat of arms. All of Chile's major
environmental issues, including air pollution, water contamination,
mining discharges, and deforestation, have contributed to the destruc-
tion of Chile's natural habitats. In one example, mining operations in
the Atacama Desert have been steadily exhausting the region's scarce
water resources, and in 1995 the indigenous Aymara communities pro-
tested that mining projects were drying out salt pans and Andean
lakes where llamas, alpacas, guanacos and vicufias dwelled. -45
Chile's unregulated fishing industry has decimated the fish supply
in Chilean waters. In 1990 Chile ranked third worldwide in terms of
total fish output, behind only Japan and the then Soviet Union." 6
However, whereas other countries fished over widespread regions of
the seas, Chileans generally fished solely in Chilean territorial wa-
ters .47 This led to a substantial reduction in the local fish supply,3 48
and by 1992 at least eighteen species of fish were in danger of
extinction.349
341. Id.
342. This includes, among others, mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish. Id.
343. The percentage of each group experiencing survival problems were: mammals,
56%; birds, 17%; reptiles, 58%; and fish, 100%. Id.
344. Don Podesta, The Environment Running Second, WASH. PoST, Feb. 4, 1993, at
A14.
345. Chile-Environment Central Bank to Provide Regular Updates, supra note 61
("[E]nvironmentalists point out that animal species native to the region's salt pans and
lakes-flamingos, seagulls and other birds, as well as chinchillas and other rodents-are
being virtually wiped out.").
346. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4. In 1991 Chile earned approximately $1 billion through
its fishing industry. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment, supra
note 34.
347. Frasca, supra note 35, at 4.
348. See Larmer, supra note 25, at 41.
349. Chile Chooses Economic Growth over Healthy Environment, supra note 34. By
1987 one fish, the crucial Spanish sardine, was already overharvested and depleted. Frasca,
supra note 35, at 4. As a result, the Aylwin administration maintained a prohibition on the
harvesting of the Spanish sardine by new vessels, pending the results of further studies. Id.
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V. The Environmental Framework Law of 1994
A. Motivations Behind the Law
1. The Need for an Effective Regulatory System
As discussed previously, Chile's local environmental standards
were often contradictory, and this produced a need for a national en-
vironmental law capable of regulating both businesses and govern-
ment agencies.3 5 0 Prior to the enactment of the Framework Law,
government agencies often worked across the regulatory board, caus-
ing uncertainty and adding layers of bureaucracy to the enforcement
of environmental rules.3 5 1 The comprehensive Framework Law was
designed to establish an effective regulatory scheme for Chile's ex-
isting and forthcoming environmental laws.
3 2
2. Free Trade
Free trade, or rather the prospect of free trade, played an impor-
tant role in Chile's recent environmental reform movement. While
public opinion ushered in a democratically elected government and
reflected the beginning of a new era of environmental consciousness,
the prospect of free trade with the United States was a powerful mo-
tivator and provided Chile with added incentive to implement envi-
ronmental reforms. Ultimately, the increasing importance of world
trade heightened Chile's interest in environmental protection, 53 and
the prospect of free trade with the United States catalyzed Chile's
emerging reform movement and helped to bring about the Environ-
mental Framework Law.
Over the past few years, Chile has been actively seeking trade
agreements to expand its export market as part of its trade liberaliza-
tion policyY3 4 A key item on Chile's trade agenda has been a free
350. 206 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
351. Id For example, the National Health Service, under petition from CONAF
closed the La Campafia gold mine in central Chile for several weeks in February 1993
because the mine caused a natural water well, contaminated with arsenic, to overflow,
contaminating the water supply of campsites. Id. The Ministry of Mining disputed tha
suspension of the mine, and the Ministry itself had to act as the intermediary of the con-
flict. Id.
352. See Bradbury, supra note 76, at 6.
353. Id.
354. See Turner, supra note 12, at 13. Chile signed a free trade agreement with Mexico
in 1991 which doubled Chile's exports to Mexico. Id. Chile has also negotiated bilateral
free trade agreements with Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Richard Aim, Reforms Pay
Off for Chile, NAFTA Nations Welcome Prospect of New Member, DAU.As MorNiNG
NEws, Dec. 12,1994, at D1. Preferential trade agreements have been reached with Argen-
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trade agreement with the United States.3 5  For Chile, a free trade
agreement with the United States would create more jobs, increase
export revenues, and provide greater internal political stability due to
economic growth and prosperity.356 By removing trade barriers, an
agreement would increase U.S. investment in Chile, give Chile a boost
in international stature that would attract more foreign investment,
and provide Chile with easier access to North America's huge market,
which represents about one-third of the world economy.357
As discussed previously, the Aylwin administration did not ad-
dress Chile's major environmental problems initially because the gov-
ernment focused first on stabilizing itself politically and economically.
However, in mid-1992 a report by the United States General Account-
ing Office warned that Chile's free trade bid with the United States
would be jeopardized by continued environmental negligence.358 The
report noted that Chile lacked laws in several crucial environmental
areas and pointed out that many of the existing laws were unknown or
ignored. 9 Moreover, the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) indicated clearly that any countries interested in
joining a free trade agreement with the United States would need to
tina and Peru, and an agreement with Ecuador may be in the near future. Turner, supra
note 37, at 18. Chile recently signed an arrangement with MERCOSUR members (Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay) regarding a trade agreement. In 1995 Chile officially en-
tered the Asian Pacific Economic Council. Juan Carlos Corral, Chile: Latin America
Trade Finance 1995-1996, LATIN FIN., Sept. 1995, at 76.
355. Trner, supra note 37, at 18; Business Outlook: Chile, supra note 64. Trade with
the United States is crucial to Chile's economy. The United States is Chile's largest trading
partner, accounting for roughly 20% to 23% of Chile's total imports and absorbing 17% to
20% of its exports. Turner, supra note 37, at 18; see generally Wilson, supra note 9. Com-
bined trade between the United States and Chile has grown for seven straight years, reach-
ing roughly $4.2 billion in 1993. Wilson, supra note 9. U.S. exports to Chile totalled $2.4
billion in 1993, an increase of 200% since 1986. Id. Overall, U.S.-Chilean trade has
doubled over the last ten years. Id. The United States is also the principal foreign investor
in many of Chile's industries, including the banking, insurance, forestry, mining, and agri-
cultural industries. ld. Total U.S. investments in Chile surpassed 27% of GDP in 1993, six
times the average rate for the region. Id. Moreover, between 1974 and 1992, the United
States accounted for 37% of all foreign investment in Chile. Turner, supra note 37, at 18.
356. See Wilson, supra note 9.
357. See Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
358. Id. The United States was concerned, inter alia, that Chile's economy, although a
free market triumph, had been using its unregulated system as a lure for foreign invest-
ment. Id. For instance, between 1987 and 1992, investment in the Canadian mining sector
had been steadily decreasing as investors headed for countries like Chile with, among other
benefits, less stringent environmental regulations. Toronto Mining Industry Begins Cam-
paign, CALGARY H-ALD, Sept. 24, 1993, at C3.
359. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
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meet "certain minimum environmental requirements." Indeed, the
USTR has repeatedly reaffirmed that strict environmental standards,
including some type of framework law, are prerequisites for any coun-
try wishing to join NAFTA.361' Such standards would certainly re-
quire, at a minimum, a basic set of environmental laws and
regulations.
362
The comments of the United States regarding minimum environ-
mental standards influenced Chile's government, and the prospect of
losing a free trade agreement over environmental issues had a signifi-
cant impact on the government's environmental policy.2 63 As one
Chilean official stated in 1992, "Chile doesn't want to lose out on a
free-trade agreement with the U.S. due to a poor environmental rec-
ord."316 Accordingly, by August 1992 the government was actively de-
bating a comprehensive environmental law. 65 By September 1992 the
administration introduced the nation's first "omnibus environmental
law."366 Not surprisingly, it was "painstakingly designed to appease
Washington's qualms. 367
B. Enactment
CONAMA, along with a few other ministries, worked on the
Framework Law throughout 1 9 9 2 .36s By mid-September 1992 Presi-
360. North American Nations Ratify NAFTA, Endorse Environmental Protection as Vi.
tal Cross-Border Issue, ENV'T NVATCH LAnN Am., Dec. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, Iacn-s File.
361. Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, ENV'r
WATCH LATIN Ai., Feb. 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
362. North American Nations Ratify NAFTA, Endorse Environmental Protection as Ui-
tal Cross-Border Issue, supra note 360.
363. See Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9. Free trade has acted as a stimulus to environ-
mental change before. In particular, the prospect of free trade stimulated environmental
reform in Mexico during Mexico's journey toward a free trade agreement with the United
States. See U.S. and Mexican Officials Say NAFTA is World's Most Environmentally Sensi.
tive Trade Agreement; Critics Disagree, ENV'T WATCH LATIN Am., Aug. 1992, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, Iacns File ("It's no coincidence that Mexico's 'environmental-
protection revolution' coincided with free-trade negotiations.") [hereinafter World's Most
Environmentally Sensitive Trade Agreement]. Mexico's entry into NAFTA %%as based on
the condition that it would respect certain en'ironmental norms. Latin Amertca-Envi-
ronment7 Urban and Rural Areas Still Threatened, Inter Press Service, June 4, 1994, avail.
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File.
364. World's Most Environmentally Sensitive Trade Agreement, supra note 363.
365. Id.
366. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
367. Id.
368. Chile's Framework Environmental Law Goes to Congress For Debate, E-v'T
WATH LATIN Am., Oct. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
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dent Aylwin forwarded the comprehensive Framework Law, the first
in Chile's history, to Congress for passage. 369 Chile's Senate approved
the Environmental Framework Law on August 3, 1993, nearly one
year after being sent to Congress for review.70 The lower house, the
Chamber of Deputies, finally approved the Environmental Frame-
work Law in late January 1994, following more than a year of de-
bate.371 President Aylwin signed the Environmental Framework Law
on March 1, 1994.372
C. Summary of the Environmental Framework Law
The Framework Law is intended to "coordinate environmental
regulations and enforcement" between government agencies. 373 The
Framework Law sets the foundation for the enactment of nearly 2000
regulations related to pollution control, as well as all future regula-
tions enacted by the government.374 Among other things, the Frame-
work Law requires environmental impact studies for most major
projects, requires polluters to formulate cleanup plans, and defines a
mechanism for resolving environment-related disputes.3 75
Under the Framework Law, CONAMA became the country's
central environmental protection agency, possessing the authority to
formulate environmental policy and oversee implementation and en-
forcement of environmental regulations by other agencies.37°
Although enforcement is spread throughout the executive branch,
CONAMA coordinates the efforts of the other ministries377 and has
ultimate authority.378 Thus, CONAMA is the sole government agency
in charge of pollution issues, and the agency has the authority to solve
any disputes to ensure new standards are enforced properly with mini-
369. hI.
370. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM.,
Sept. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
371. Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, supra note
361.
372. The Framework Law, Ley Bases del Medio Ambiente, is codified as D.L. 19,300.
See Environmental Regulations: Chile, supra note 139.
373. CONAMA Creates Guidelines to Evaluate Environmental Impact Studies, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN AM., Nov. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinaf-
ter CONAMA Creates Guidelines].
374. Chilean Congress Approves Environmental Framework Law, Bus. LATIN AM.,
Feb. 14,1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
375. Id
376. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, supra note 370.
377. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9.
378. Chile's Framework Environmental Law Goes to Congress For Debate, supra note
368.
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mal agency or ministry overlap.379 CONAMA was granted this en-
forcement authority for three years.3 60
The Framework Law does not contain specific regulations on en-
vironmental standards like other Latin American codes.3' 1 The gov-
ernment did not want to set ambitious goals and limits which would be
ignored or remain unenforced. As a result, although the Framework
Law includes broad standards for environmental quality and policy,
specific standards were left to be determined by future regulations
and legislation.38 The Framework Law does, however, establish pre-
cise procedures for introducing new environmental regulations-'-3
1. The Environmental Impact Assessment Process
A major element of the Framework Law is that it requires virtu-
ally all new major projects, private or public, to submit an Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) or an Environmental Impact
Declaration (EID) to CONAMA or a Regional Environmental Com-
mission (COREMA), a regional office of CONAMA, for approval. -'3 4
The Framework Law's EIA system is designed to provide the govern-
ment with information about a particular project's environmental im-
pact prior to the project's approval. s5  EIAs are required for those
projects that could have a significant impact on the environment,
while less-detailed EIDs are mandated for projects which are unlikely
to have a significant effect on the environment.2- 6 Generally, declara-
tions, as opposed to assessments, are required for those projects which
are not listed as requiring full assessments. -s7 Projects which require
full assessments include dams, irrigation projects, thermoelectric and
hydroelectric power generators, urban and tourist resort develop-
ments, oil and gas pipelines, aqueducts, and mining-related opera-
379. 206 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
380. Environmental Regulations in Chile, Bus. Lkm AM., May 17, 1993. avadable in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File.
381. Chiles Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, supra note
361 (statement of Rafael Asenjo, director of CONAMA) ("We went for a frameork law
and not for a code as in Peru, Mexico, or Colombia, because it is more realistic.").
382. Z06 Environmental Law, supra note 144.
383. Chile. Moving Towards Greener Pastures, supra note 234.
384. Chile's Framework Environmental Law Goes to Congress For Debate, supra note
368.
385. See Jos6 Urrutia & Stephan Roady, Legal Mechanisms to Achieve Sustainable D.-
velopment: The Case of Chile 10 (1993) (manuscript on file with author).
386. ILd.
387. CONAMA Creates Guidelines, supra note 373.
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tions.388 After the project's sponsor prepares an assessment or
declaration, CONAMA, along with regional COREMAs, will review
the assessment or declaration to determine whether the sponsor erred
in evaluating the project's potential environmental harm.38 9
CONAMA has final authority to approve the project.39° Although
the Framework Law requires EIAs or EIDs for new projects, it does
not mandate them for existing projects. 391 Nevertheless, CONAMA
will develop and enforce regulations covering all industries to protect
the air, water, and soil of Chile.3 2
2. Environmental Standards
The Framework Law also directs each ministry to develop regula-
tions, or norms,393 to control all substances and discharges that could
affect the air, water, or land of the nation.
3. Civil Liability
The Framework Law imposes liability for environmental harm
based upon the "polluter pays" principle.394 Accordingly, the law cre-
ates a new type of lawsuit, the "environmental action," which allows
citizens or government authorities to bring suits against individuals
and organizations to force polluters to restore the environment.3 95 As
for liability for unintentional pollution, the law only requires that
plaintiffs show that the environmental damage occurred in violation of
existing environmental regulations. Thus, no intent to pollute must be
shown to impose liability.
396
388. let
389. See Urrutia & Roady, supra note 385, at 11.
390. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, supra note 370.
391. CONAMA Creates Guidelines, supra note 373. Though not required nationally,
many companies in Chile voluntarily conducted impact studies prior to the law's passage.
See Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and Plan New Ones, supra note 77.
392. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, supra note 370.
393. Norms of quality are defined as "that which establishes the maximum permissible
levels of substances whose presence could constitute a risk for public health, or the preser-
vation, conservation, protection, restoration, or improvement of the environment." Chile's
Framework Environmental Law Goes to Congress For Debate, supra note 368.
394. Environmental Regulations: Chile, supra note 139.
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4. Formulation of Cleanup Plans
The Framework Law recognizes that industries must be allowed
to comply with environmental regulations gradually if Chile is to meet
its goal of becoming a "developed" nation by the end of the cen-
tury.397 Thus, the Framework Law is designed to curb pollution with-
out unduly threatening existing industries with immediate fines or
impractical cleanup schedules.39s Consequently, environmental pro-
grams will continue to be negotiated on a case-by-case basisO ')
D. The Role of the Environmental Framework Law
The Framework Law "has great potential to set the precedent by
which Chile addresses environmental issues for a number of years." '
The Framework Law enables citizens and nongovernmental organiza-
tions to challenge polluters through the legal system, which is crucial
for Chile since the principal polluter is the government, through its
state-owned companies, which has "historically been unwilling to
prosecute itself."'" On a broader scale, the Framework Law provides
Chile with an institutional foundation that will allow the government
to create an efficient, competent, and enforceable regulatory
scheme.4 2 The Framework Law will enable the government to over-
haul its previous system of antiquated statutes and regulations, which
only hindered attempts to deal with the country's environmental
woes.4° 3 Furthermore, by specifically delineating the process for in-
troducing new regulations, the law will end the previous uncoordi-
nated issuance of decrees by different ministries, which "left
environmental regulations and laws scattered among nearly 800 differ-
ent documents."4'
However, although the Framework Law took effect in 1994, many
of its provisions will not become functional until CONAMA develops




400. Urrutia & Roady, supra note 385, at 25.
401. Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, supra note
361.
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by the current Frei administration and subsequent administrations. 0 6
Although CONAMA does not have an official timetable for establish-
ing these regulations, the agency will probably move quickly to bring
its environmental laws into full swing with Chile's NAFTA entry on
the horizon.
E. Criticism
Immediately after the Framework Law's passage, companies
voiced few complaints because the law implements changes gradually
and gives them time to clean up existing facilities without unreasona-
ble deadlines or threats of immediate fines.407 Moreover, the Frame-
work Law is not retroactive, so companies are not financially
responsible for cleaning up past pollution, unless it is shown that they
were in violation of an existing environmental law at the time of con-
tamination.40 In short, companies have generally endorsed the
Framework Law because it will eventually define the rights and obli-
gations of both private and public entities.40 9 By contrast, environ-
406. However, CONAMA did release some regulations prior to the passage of the
Framework Law. Before its release, the business community criticized the draft Frame-
work Law for not containing specific guidelines on presenting and evaluating the impact
studies. CONAMA Creates Guidelines, supra note 373. The administration did not wait
for the Framework Law to be passed by Congress to respond to this criticism. See Id. In
October 1993 CONAMA released guidelines for the evaluation of environmental impact
reports submitted to the agency for new projects. Id. The instructions were prepared by
CONAMA, with the help of other agencies and private consultants, id., and issued by
Aylwin in September 1993 in anticipation of the Framework Law's passage. See Chile:
Environment Commission Releases Environmental Impact Policy, BBC Monitoring Ser-
vice: Latin America, Oct. 19. 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File [herein-
after Environment Commission]. The regulations were created primarily in response to
complaints from business owners and environmentalists about the proposed Framework
Law's lack of guidance regarding the procedures to be followed in preparing impact stud-
ies. Environment Commission, supra. The guidelines were based on what the forthcoming
Framework Law would contain substantively. Id. The guidelines established a common
administrative procedure by defining what each environmental impact study must contain,
and what information might be requested from those who were promoting the project. Id.
The guidelines also established review criteria for the studies. Id. While the guidelines
were temporary provisions and not mandatory until the Framework Law was passed, the
guidelines were vital to unifying the criteria used by various government agencies to deter-
mine the minimum requirements of an impact study. CONAMA Creates Guidelines, supra
note 373. The guidelines were intended to organize and prepare the public sector, which
had experienced conflicting policies between different government agencies with overlap-
ping jurisdictions, for the task of evaluating impact studies using criteria established in the
Framework Law. Id.
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mentalists have criticized the Framework Law for not being
sufficiently comprehensive.41°
VI. The Future of Chile's Environmental Movement: The
Frei Administration (1994-200)
A. Economic Policy
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Frei), a member of the Christian Dem-
ocratic Party and son of former president Eduardo Frei Montalva,
won the presidential election held in December 1993.41 Frei took of-
fice on March 11, 1994 for a six-year term412 The election marked
Chile's first transition in twenty years from one democratically elected
president to the next. 13
After taking office, Frei was under considerable pressure to con-
tinue the economic path of Aylwin's administration 414-a policy of
measured and rational development, in which the economy, though
subjected to regulation, yields steady growth-as opposed to Pi-
nochet's unrestricted, growth-at-all-costs policy. Frei, a steadfast pro-
ponent of free trade and the open market system,415 has generally
continued the approach of his immediate predecessor. Whereas
Aylwin initially encountered the challenge of political stabilization,
Frei faced, and continues to face, the complex problems of a more
"mature democracy"-political forces intertwined with delicate social
issues and serious environmental concerns. 416
410. Chile's Environmental Framework Law Goes to Congress For Debate, supra note
368. For instance, Manuel Baquedano, president of the Institute of Environmental Policy.
argued that the Framework Law was thrown together hastily, primarily for the purpose of
"responding to the requirements of the Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the U.S:"
Id As a result, the law was "fitted to merely meet free trade accord requirements vithout
an eye to really defining and solving existing problems." Huneeus, supra note 11. at A9.
411. Chilean President-Elect Outlines Environmental Policy for Next Adminstration,
ENV'T VATCH LATIN Am., Jan. 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnw5 File
[hereinafter President-Elect Outlines Environmental Policy]. Frei was elected with 5% of
the vote. WoRL FACrBoox, supra note 54.
412. Santiago Updates Emissions Standards, supra note S5.
413. Turner, supra note 37, at 18.
414. President-Elect Outlines Environmental Poli,; supra note 411,
415. Ira Stepanian, Chile NAFTA Promising Mir, BOSTON HERALD, Dcc. 8, 1994, at
39.
416. See Halper, supra note 26, at AS ("For many Chileans, the election confirmed the
end of an often convulsive episode in which the nation departed from, and then returned
to, its tradition of centrist democratic politics .... The drama of democ, ratic renewal is
past. The emotion is gone.").
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As expected, the Frei administration increased social spending to
develop strong domestic programs to raise Chile's standard of liv-
ing.4 17 As for general economic policy, after assuming office Frei an-
nounced he was committed to expanding trade through continued
export diversification 418 and encouragement of foreign investment. 419
At his inaugural address, Frei encouraged the establishment of open
markets throughout Latin America, which was consistent with Chile's
expansionist approach toward regional trade. 20 Though down from
1992, Chile's steady growth is generally expected to continue at a rate
of approximately four to five percent per year.421 Overall, slower
growth is expected until world commodity prices recover,422 but in-
creased foreign trade is expected in the future due to Chile's forth-
coming membership in NAFrA.
B. Environmental Policy
In January 1994 President-elect Frei outlined the environmental
goals for his administration, set to begin in March.423 Frei promised to
continue his party's policy, commenced by Aylwin primarily in the
second half of his term, of cleaning up the environment.424 However,
Frei is not an extreme environmentalist and will not implement envi-
ronmental standards which would drastically stunt the economy.425
Nevertheless, the Frei administration is expected to focus more re-
sources on cleaning up the environment,"26 and recent polls have con-
sistently shown a high level of public support for environmental
protection.427 The Frei administration's environmental priorities in-
clude air and water pollution, soil erosion, and the protection of natu-
417. Tirner, supra note 37, at 18.
418. Despite substantial export diversification, copper still accounted for approximately
36% of Chile's total export earnings ($3.3 billion) by 1993. Id.
419. This was not considered a difficult task in light of Chile's high investment rating.
Id. In addition, by 1994 actual foreign investment in Chile had been averaging more than
$1 billion per year since 1989, and in 1993 investment rose to $1.7 billion, which indicated
strong foreign investor confidence. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Tbrner, supra note 37, at 18.
423. President-Elect Outlines Environmental Policy, supra note 411.
424. I&
425. Peter Morton, Land of Opportunity: Companies Rush to Chile to Coach Mining
and Energy Firms on Being Good Environmental Citizens, FIN. PosT, Jan. 28, 1995, at 8
(statement of President Frei) ("We cannot afford not to take advantage of the generous
resources at our disposal for the sake of a naive and romantic conservatism.").
426. Changing Priorities: Anticipated Changes in Patterns, supra note 66.
427. Shapiro, supra note 312.
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ral resources, such as native forests and fish, from overexploitation. 2'
To address these issues, Frei is expected to develop additional regula-
tions addressing air and water pollution, soil erosion,4 z9 and the use of
natural resources. 30 Frei's government is also expected to create a
permitting system where land use can be controlled based on the type
and condition of soil.
4 3 1
CONAMA's priorities include developing regulations clarifying
the Framework Law's EIA process and establishing quality standards
for air, water, and soil.432 An important task to date has been to es-
tablish guidelines for mandatory cleanup projects and impact studies
for heavily polluting companies, such as CODELCO and ENAI. "33
Approval of the Framework Law paves the way for additional envi-
ronmental legislation, including a clean water act, a clean air act, and a
natural resources act.431 However, it could take up to five years to
introduce these new laws since there is no official legislative
timetable.435
In particular, Frei is likely to tackle the issue of water contamina-
tion aggressively over the next three years.4 6 There is also specula-
tion that Frei will privatize the water utilities and will encourage
industries to treat their liquid waste by issuing clearer norms, estab-
lishing better control systems, and dishing out tougher penalties
4 37
The Frei administration also plans to introduce municipal projects di-
428. For instance, in January 1995 the Frei administration halted new sales of tracts of
rare temperate rainforest after reports revealed that loggers were clear cutting the forests,
which they bought for as little as $2 an acre. Chile Halts Sales of Rainforest Land, Reuters
World Service, Jan. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Reuwld File. The log-
gers then sold the lumber at top market prices. Id. The prohibition included all sales of
"native forests" belonging to the Ministry of National Assets (roughly 2.4 million acres),
including old-growth woods in southern Chile. Id. The halt will remain in effect until the
Ministry carries out studies on the forests' value, which could take a few years. I& The
reports helped focus attention to the plight of the native forests on Chile's southern coast,
and have catalyzed the country's growing conservation movement. Id.
429. President Aylwin never addressed the issue of soil erosion during his administra-
tion, though it was a serious ecological problem. President-Elect Outlines Environmental
Policy supra note 411. Large areas of land, particularly in the %ineyards on the southern
end of the Atacama Desert, have been severely eroded. Id.
430. Ld.
431. Id.




436. Environmental Issues: Regulation and Privatisation for Water Pollution, Country
Forecast, July 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiucf File.
437. Id.
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rected at developing and improving Chile's infrastructure. 43s Finally,
crucial to Frei's environmental policy is the critical Environmental
Framework Law, signed by Aylwin ten days before Frei took office.
The Frei administration is counting on the landmark Framework Law
to strengthen the government's ability to address Chile's current envi-
ronmental issues.439
VII. Conclusion
Chile's recent economic successes stem from the growth-intensive
policies instituted by Pinochet, who ruled the country between 1973
and 1990.41o Indeed, Pinochet's extreme policies enabled Chile to
work an "economic miracle.""' However, by focusing exclusively on
rapid economic development, the military regime facilitated and en-
couraged the widespread abuse of Chile's environment. As a result,
Chile's solid economic growth over the past decade has exacted a
heavy toll on the people and natural resources of the country, leaving
Chile as perhaps the most environmentally devastated country in
South America.
44 2
The civilian government which followed the military regime was
left to resolve the environmental problems caused by its predecessor.
The Aylwin administration faced the challenging dilemma of having to
maintain economic growth while increasing environmental reform and
regulation over the economy. Nevertheless, by the middle of his term
Aylwin had launched an unprecedented movement to reduce the
abuse of Chile's environment in an attempt to safeguard the contin-
ued existence of Chile's precious natural resources. His administra-
tion implemented, among other laws, crucial regulations targeting
water contamination and industrial and vehicular emissions. More-
over, in 1994 Aylwin signed Chile's first comprehensive environmental
law, the Environmental Framework Law, which will give future ad-
ministrations the necessary tools to create an effective environmental
regulatory system. Although Chile faces a long journey in its crusade
438. Turner, supra note 37, at 18. Upcoming projects include, among other things, elec-
tronic toll road concessions, a monorail for Santiago, more sewage treatment facilities, a
highway concession program, privatization of the Chilean railroad's cargo system, and a
fiber optic network. Id.
439. President-Elect Outlines Environmental Policy, supra note 411.
440. Pinochet currently retains his position as the commander of Chile's army and
"continues to cast a shadow over the nations's politics." Halper, supra note 26, at A8.
441. Wilson, supra note 9.
442. David Madeo, Environmental Exports to Latin America, LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.,
Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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to clean up its environment, 43 results are already apparent as individ-
uals, businesses, companies, and industries-both public and pri-
vate-alter their behavior to comply with recent and upcoming
environmental reforms.
As the turn of the century approaches, the convergence of free
trade and the environment will reach its apex as the nations of the
Western Hemisphere tackle the complex task of forging the Free
Trade Area of the Americas. As the first Latin American country se-
lected to enter a free trade agreement with North America, Chile has
been perceived as a model for other Latin American nations to follow.
Yet, Chile does not offer other Latin American countries a model for
development, but rather illustrates a valuable lesson in development.
Chile, with its economic successes and environmental horrors, reaf-
firms the compelling message which all developing countries, particu-
larly Chile's Latin American neighbors, must heed: although the free
market system should be embraced, a measured economic approach,
one tempered by environmental foresight, is ultimately preferable to a
growth-at-all-costs policy.
443. In 1992 it was estimated that Chile's campaign to protect its environment could
cost a total of $9 billion-five times more than the national budget at the time-and run
vell into the 21st century. Huneeus, supra note 11, at A9; see also Chile's Environmental
Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, supra note 361 (statement of Rafael Asanjo,
director of CONAMA) ("We believe that environmental problems have been created over
decades and cleaning up will take time. There are no miracles in environmental manage-
ment; that is demagogy."); Newvman, supra note 122 (statement of Julio Escudero. member
of CEDRM) ("You have to change people's minds in order to change their behavior and
that is something that can take a lot of time. Some of the changes are going to take a
generation.").
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